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There are these two young ﬁsh swimming along, and they happen to
meet an older ﬁsh swimming the other way, who nods at them and
says, "Morning, boys, how’s the water?" And the two young ﬁsh swim
on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other
and goes, "What the hell is water?".
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Introduction
This thesis is the result of a three-year research activity within the Ph.D. Program
in Law and Economics at Luiss University. It is composed of three essays on dif-
ferent topics in Law and Economics, which have been presented separately in the
form of papers in various conferences and seminars through the years and have
beneﬁted from the contribution of many people and institutions, as acknowl-
edged in the introductory footnote of each essay.
Although related to seemingly unrelated topics, there is one fundamental link that
connects the three essays: the theory of incentives. The idea that economic ac-
tors take decisions according to the economic environment in which they act goes
back to the origins of economic thought. However, a formal treatment of a uniﬁed
Theory of Incentives has been the highest achievement in economics in the last
thirty years1. In this thesis, I apply the Theory of Incentives to three distinct issues
in Law and Economics, trying to ﬁnd similarities and common elements across
different problems and turning each issue into a general and more easy to handle
framework.
The most popular model of incentives in economic theory is the “principal-agent”
model, which basically tends to capture all the situations in which there is an
actor, the principal, that wants to induce another individual, the agent, to per-
form a task for the principal. This way of looking at many economic issues has
completely reshaped economists’ minds and has led to fruitful results in all areas
of economics, including Law and Economics2. Therefore, the “principal-agent”
model is the lens through which I will look at several economic phenomena, both
from a positive and a normative point of view. The positive approach is needed,
1For a survey on Incentives in Economic Thought see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort,
The Theory of Incentives, The Principal-Agent Model, Ch.1, Princeton University Press, 2002.
2See for instance Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard University
Press, 2004.
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in the ﬁrst instance, in order to assess the pros and the cons of the structure of in-
centives currently in place in a given economic environment. The normative ap-
proach is instead needed in order to ascertain the existence of welfare-improving
changes in the institutional framework and to design enhanced incentive systems.
The link to the classical Law and Economics literature is straightforward: the in-
stitutional framework and the structure of incentives are, in the real world, mainly
dictated by the legal system.
Corporate Governance in aMulti-Principal Environment. The ﬁrst essay revis-
its the theory of corporate governance, with a focus on the institutional gover-
nance of banking ﬁrms. The essay draws on a largely neglected contribution by
Stiglitz (1985) and builds up a model in order to analyze the conﬂicts emerging
between shareholders and debt- holders concerning the level of risk of the ven-
ture. The model is developed within a common agency framework, where man-
agers are regarded as agent of both shareholders and debt-holders. In this setting,
moral hazard on the behalf of the manager concerns two dimensions: shirking
and risk taking. The common agency model highlights the conﬂicts emerging be-
tween the principals in terms of risk taking behavior and among the principals
and the agent in terms of the level of effort undertaken by the agent.
The paper explores the optimal compensation structure for themanager that leads
to Pareto efﬁciency. Then, the case in which shareholders and debt-holders con-
ﬂict regarding the payment scheme is analyzed and the main conclusion is that
a multiplicity of allocations can arise in equilibrium. Therefore, I refer to some
legal institutions, concerning both the compensation structure and the extent of
ﬁduciary duties, with the purpose of reﬁning attainable equilibria. Hence, I ﬁrst
focus on the liability regime that can be activated by the debt-holder in case of
failure of the project. Then, following Bernheim and Whinston (1986), I suggest
two institutional remedies. The ﬁrst institution relies on the role of intermediate
bodies between the principals and the agent for implementing the optimal allo-
cation through indirect mechanism designs. The second remedy is a regulatory
intervention aimed at providing lower and upper bounds for the agent’s aggregate
transfers.
Myopia and Paternalism in the Design of Social Security Schemes. The second
essay deals with a classical issue in Public Law and Economics: the optimal de-
sign of pension systems. Several rationales have been provided in order to explain
the role of social security programs in modern welfare states. The most common
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explanation is that social security systems act as a paternalistic device that forces
individuals who suffer from myopia regarding future consumption paths to ade-
quately save for their retirement. The essay investigates the role of myopia under
different assumptions. So far, the “myopia” argument has been based on the fact
that people fail in fully taking into account their future behavior. This has led to
a justiﬁcation for public pensions that is related to compulsory savings. I analyze
this literature in the light of the emerging trends in the ﬁeld of behavioral eco-
nomics. First I analyze the optimal pension scheme when all the agents in the
economy are myopic, and then I extend the analysis to the case in which only
part of the population is myopic, while the rest is made of fully rational individ-
uals. I show that under the assumption of a paternalistic social planner, welfare
improving “pay-as-you-go” schemes involve redistribution of resources from fully
rational agents to myopics. In this last section, I suggest that myopia can be seen
not only as a psychological bias, but also as a strategic tool. Indeed, challenging
the classical view on myopia, I claim that the degree of myopia can be determined
not only by psychological biases, but also, to a certain degree, by a strategic com-
mitment of some individuals that aim at capturing the beneﬁts of redistribution
towards myopics.
Regulation and Investment Incentives for Broadband Access Networks. In the
third essay, I focus on the telecommunications industry and on the incentives for
the players to invest in new broadband infrastructures. Indeed, a ﬁerce debate
on how to stimulate investments in the access network is currently taking place
in the EU. This debate is a consequence of the fact that the realization of new
infrastructures becomes more and more urgent, in the light of the boost in the de-
mand for on-line contents. Indeed, this transition phase brings new problems for
the telecommunications industry and therefore a new regulatory approach is re-
quired. At the European level, this debate has conﬂictedwith the review of the reg-
ulatory framework and has led to new regulatory proposals both from the Com-
mission and from national authorities. A plurality of proposals have been sug-
gested by both market players and institutional bodies. At the same time, many
national regulators have already started pursuing their own strategies in order to
spur investments.
The paper acknowledges the trade-off among investment incentives and degree of
competition in the markets and accordingly sketches an optimal policy mix, tak-
ing both dynamic and static efﬁciency concerns into account. In particular, I pro-
pose a set of policy tools that can guarantee the achievement of an optimal level
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of investments through the sharing of both operative and regulatory risk among
market players. In my opinion, the optimal mechanism consists of an auction
among market players for wholesale interconnection. Essentially, the access divi-
sion could auction physical and logical interconnection rights for different levels
of the network and then set the initial price accordingly to the proximity of the
interconnection point with the ﬁnal customer, thus reﬂecting the costs of deploy-
ing the infrastructure up to the interconnection. The most attractive feature of an
auction mechanism like this one relates to the creation of a risk-sharing device:
indeed, if a competitor opts for a high level of interconnection, the latter will have
to invest signiﬁcantly to reach the ﬁnal customer, but the auction price will be
lower. From the market players point of view, an auction mechanism like this is
equivalent to an auction for options whose exercise price is the price paid by the
winner. Therefore, each player, once given the interconnection right, faces the op-
tion among investing (not exercising the option) or delaying the investment (thus
exercising the option).
Moreover, the paper provides new empirical evidence on European broadband
ﬁxed markets with respect to both broadband adoption and investment choices
by the market players, with the aim of assessing the effectiveness of the new EU
regulatory framework of 2002 and to draw some lessons for the next-generation
networks context.
The paper makes use of two different data sets. The ﬁrst one is a country-level
panel covering a time span of ten years (1997 – 2007) and 28 countries, mainly be-
longing to the EU, which includes regulatory indexes on 1) the presence of entry
barriers in the sector, 2) the percentage of State ownership of telecom ﬁrms and
3) the degree of competition in the markets. From a regulatory point of view, the
main result obtained from the estimation exercise is that a more competitive envi-
ronment leads to higher adoption rates. The second data set is at a ﬁrm-level and
is composed of 37 European ﬁrms (24 incumbents and 13 competitors), analyzed
over a time span of ﬁve years (2003-2007). The analysis focuses on the investment
behavior and the main ﬁnding is that more competitive markets tend to decrease
the incentives to invest in the network. Therefore, the classical trade-off among
static and dynamic efﬁciency is conﬁrmed.
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CHAPTER 1
Corporate governance in a Multi-Principal environment1
ABSTRACT. The paper explores the theory of corporate governance within a com-
mon agency framework, where managers are regarded as agent of both sharehold-
ers and debt holders. In this setting, moral hazard concerns two dimensions: ef-
fort and risk taking. The common agency model highlights the conﬂicts emerging
between the principals in terms of risk taking behavior and among the principals
and the agent in terms of the level of effort undertaken by the agent. The problem
of the multiplicity of equilibria is tackled by imposing conditions on the monetary
transfers and liability regimes. Policy considerations for managers’ compensation
and ﬁduciary duties are analyzed.
1.1. Introduction
The problem of risk taking by ﬁrms and in particular by ﬁnancial intermediaries
is at the core of the current debate on the genesis of ﬁnancial crises and systemic
risk2. The choice over the amount of risk that a ﬁrm can bear is made by the man-
agers of the ﬁrm itself, although they can be led to choose a given proﬁle of risk
because of the incentives provided by the owners of the ﬁrm with respect to man-
agers’ compensation and liability regime.
The starting point of this work is the fact that managers’ actions are constrained
not only by their formal contract with the shareholders, but also by less explicit
links with other stakeholders, especially external ﬁnanciers. In a quite neglected
paper, Stiglitz (1985) clearly highlights this fact:
“[...] managers are partially controlled, directly and indirectly, through
both explicit and implicit contracts and by both lenders and share-
holders. The lenders exert control through both the formal terms
1I am immensely grateful to Jacques Crémer for his helpful comments and remarks and to all the
participants to the SIDE Fifth Annual Conference, Florence, 4-5 December 2009.
2Covel et al. (2009) claim that “[a]t the core of the recent ﬁnancial market crisis has been the dis-
covery that these securities [i.e. collateralized debt obligations - CDOs] are actually far riskier than
originally advertised”. See also, for instance, “UBS admits excessive risk-taking led to $37bn write-
down”, April 21, 2008, www.marketwatch.com (12/12/2009).
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of their contract and their refusal to renew a loan; shareholders ex-
ert control through both the voting process and their refusal to pro-
vide additional capital. Managerial incentives are affected by both
the explicit pay schedule - the rewards provided by other ﬁrms who
might hire them away, provided their behavior is appropriate - and
the implicit punishments provided by other ﬁrms in their treatment
of those who are dismissed by their ﬁrms (or whose ﬁrms go bank-
rupt)” (p.141).
In the same paper, the author suggests also a possible way to model this relation-
ship:
“While the earlier literature attempted to view the manager as the
agent of the supplier of credit (the "principal"), with the supplier of
credit designing an efﬁcient incentive contract for the agent, a more
appropriate model is a multiple-principal- agent model, in which
each principal is only allowed to set certain of the terms of the con-
tract. These problems are, of course, ubiquitous in our economy,
though they have received relatively little attention.“ (p.142).
Despite the powerfulmessage of this paper, to the best ofmy knowledge no further
work has been carried out in the literature to explore and formalize this idea. This
work therefore can be considered a ﬁrst (and incomplete) attempt to formalize
the multi-principal-agent relationship within the corporation. The building block
is the intrinsic conﬂict among shareholders and debt holders concerning the de-
sirable level of risk of the venture. Indeed, as formally shown by Innes (1990), the
payment schedule of standard debt and equity contracts leads the parties to share
divergent preferences over risk. Indeed, while equity-holders face a convex pay-
ment schedule, and are thus willing to bear high levels of risk, debt-holders face a
concave schedule, and are accordingly more inclined to pull for safe projects.
Therefore, I assume that, when hiring an agent, the principals agree of the fact that
they both want him not to shirk (or, equivalently, to exert effort), but they disagree
on the level of risk that should be chosen by the manager. This idea is represented
in Figure 1. As a result, the compensation scheme of the manager and her liability
regime will be inﬂuenced by these two dimensions of moral hazard: risk taking
and effort.
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FIGURE 1.1.1
Before turning to the literature review, a technical aside. The setting is considered
here is one of intrinsic and public common agency. Intrinsic common agency
means that the agent can either accept all contracts at once or reject them, while
the game is public since both principals can contract over outcomes that are ob-
servable by both of them.
1.2. Literature review
This analysis attempted in this work can be considered an extension of the tradi-
tional Principal-Agent model within the corporation. This view traces its roots in
the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which explores the agency re-
lationship among managers and lenders of funds. This literature has been grow-
ing fast in the last thirty years and its ﬁndings are collected in a book by Tirole
(2006), whose structure is drawn from the inﬂuential paper by Hölmstrom and Ti-
role (1997). Through this approach, one can view the lenders of funds acting as
a principal with respect to an agent (the manager of the ﬁrm), who can take un-
observable actions which can improve the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. The principal
and the agent have divergent objective functions, since the ﬁrst will tend to maxi-
mize the value of the investment in the ﬁrm, while the second will try to maximize
her own utility function, by shirking or extracting “private beneﬁts” from her ac-
tivity within the ﬁrm. Therefore, a tension arises over the level of effort exerted
by the manager. This approach leads to look at the ﬁrm as a “nexus of contracts”,
with each agency relationship being treated separately3. Although very powerful,
3For a comparison among this view and theTransaction-Cost Economics literature, seeWilliamson
(1988).
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this approach fails in capturing many of the issues that arise in complex organiza-
tions, where more than two actors are involved. Indeed, situations may emerge,
like in the case at hand, where some of the players involved have conﬂicting in-
terests over different dimensions (e.g. risk taking and managerial effort), whose
economic implications cannot be fully appreciated within the traditional frame-
work.
In the paper at hand, I suggest to extend the canonical principal-agent model in
the corporate ﬁnance literature to take into account two related features at the
same time. The ﬁrst is the multi-dimensional nature of moral-hazard, in the form
of risk taking and effort, while the second one is the common agency approach,
which extends the canonical model to the case of more than one principal.
With respect to the ﬁrst issue (multi-dimensional moral hazard), the literature is
not adequately developed (Tirole, 2006). The only two papers in the literature that
try to combine the problem of excessive risk taking and managerial effort are Biais
and Casamatta (1999) and Bester and Hellwig (1987). The ﬁrst paper deals with a
discrete effort, discrete outcomes model, in which managers exert unobservable
effort and can take inefﬁcient risk by switching to less proﬁtable projects. How-
ever, the focus of the paper is more on the optimal capital structure, rather than
on managers’ compensation. They show that optimal ﬁnancial contracts can be
implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk-shifting prob-
lem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort prob-
lem is the most severe. The second paper, instead, develops a continuous effort
model through which the authors show that the presence of a pure-debt ﬁnan-
cial structure, the optimal level of effort is induced, although the manager tends
to take excessive risk. By contrast, a pure-equity structure induces the manager
to choose the optimal level of risk, at the expense of less effort. The authors con-
clude by stating that a second-best allocation can be implemented by a mixed
capital structure.
The main reference for common agency literature, is the seminal paper by Bern-
heimandWhinston (1986). They explore amulti-principal relationship in a frame-
work of delegated common agency games with moral hazard. In their paper, each
principal observes an element from a set of possible outcomes with some proba-
bility and the action chosen by the agent affects the probability attached to each
outcome. The conﬂict between principals arises from the differences in their sets
of possible outcomes. One of the main ﬁndings of the paper is that no efﬁcient
1.3. THE MODEL 15
equilibrium exists if the agent is risk averse. The literature on common agency
games has been subsequently further developed by Martimort and Stole, whose
main ﬁndings are summarized in Martimort (2006).
1.3. The model
The model, like in Biais and Casamatta (1999), is aimed at capturing two dimen-
sions of moral hazard: exerting effort and risk shifting. However, the latter, as be
considered both in the form of “over-investment” (asset substitution) and “un-
derinvestment” (inefﬁciently low risk taking). A corporation has been set, whose
capital structure is formed by a principal P1 who owns equity S, and principal P2
who owns debt D/(1+α) whose face value is equal to D and α is the net discount
factor representing the market price of debt capital. Hence, for simplicity, debt is
assumed to be zero coupon bond and, of course, has priority over equity capital.
Equity and debt have been priced in accordance with the average market price
of capital so to satisfy the principals’ individual rationality constraints. In setting
up this framework, I have in mind the case of an already existing ﬁrm, where the
principals need to hire a a new manager.
The structural assumptions are the following:
• (A1): equilibrium interest rate is equal to zero;
• (A2): the agent and the principals are risk neutral;
• (A3): the ﬁrm is the project it pursues;
• (A4): the principals are protected by limited liability;
(A1) and (A3) are simplifying assumptions. (A2) is standard for principals. Most
of corporate ﬁnance models consider the agent as being risk averse, however, the
qualitative results of the paper still hold under risk aversion of the agent. (A3)
says that all the funds of the corporation, S + D/(1 + α) = I, are allocated to the
undertaking of a speciﬁc project. Hence, the principals cannot contract on the
capital structure, but they take it as given. (A4) is also standard for principals;
however I do not assume the agent protected by limited liability since corporate
ﬁduciary law allows the principals to pay negative transfers to the agent.
After being hired, the agent chooses the vector of actions a = (ei, σj), where eiE
is the level effort exerted in the project and σjΣ is the level of risk associated with
the project. So the space of actions can be deﬁned as A = E × Σ. As we shall
see later on, effort has an impact over the cash ﬂows distribution in terms of First
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Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), while the choice over σj is a mean preserv-
ing action which affects the distribution in the sense of Second Order Stochastic
Dominance (SOSD).
The time-line is as follows. At t = 0 the corporation has been set up and the two
investors have provided respectively equity and debt to the entity. At time t = 1
each principal proposes a contract to the agent, which can either accept or refuse.
Given the nature of the intrinsic common agency problem, the agent can either
accept both offers at once or refuse them. At t = 2 the possibility for moral hazard
arises: the agent chooses her action, a = (ei, σj) from the set A. At t = 3 the
outcome is realized and cash ﬂows are distributed.
The outcome of the project R˜ :=
{
R; R
2
; 0
}
is stochastic and deﬁned according to
three equiprobable states of the world (High, Intermediate and Low). Moreover,
to make things interesting, the following conditions hold:
R > I >
R
2
> D.
This implies that debt is fully repaid both in the High and Intermediate states,
whereas equity grasps the surplus in the High state and it is partially repaid in the
Intermediate state. In the Low state, both principals get nothing.
As anticipated, effort ei can improve the distribution of the outcomes in the sense
of FOSD, while σj affects the distribution in the sense of SOSD. Hence, depending
on action a chosen by the agent, the NPV of the project is the following:
NPV (ei, σj) =
(
1
3
+ ei + σj
)
R +
(
1
3
− 2σj
)
R
2
− ψi(ei)− φj(σj)− I
with i = U,D and j = U,M,D, where
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• ei = {eU = e, eD = 0}
• σj = {σU = σ, σM = 0, σD = −σ}
• ψi(ei) = {ψU = ψ, ψD = 0}
• φj(σj) = {φU = φ, φM = 0, φD = φ, }.
Therefore, the combined effect of effort and risk taking induces six probability dis-
tributions, that can be thought as six different projects. Improving the distribution
in the sense of FOSD comes at a cost equal to ψi(ei), while SOSD has a cost φj(σj).
The cost of effort, ψi(ei), is borne by the agent and can be deemed in a multiple
way; for instance, it can be considered as managerial shirking, the undertaking
of a self dealing transaction, consumption of perks, etc. Similarly, φj(σj) is a cost
borne by the principals. This can be interpreted as the inefﬁciency cost associated
with any departure from the socially efﬁcient risk technology. For simplicity, and
coherently with the nature of the corporation, this cost is fully absorbed by P1 as
the residual claimant.
In this setting I assume that exerting effort is socially efﬁcient; however, the risk
shifting problem dominates the effort problem. So the following three conditions
hold:
1.1 eR > ψ
1.2 eR < ψ + φ
1.3 σ > e
Condition 1.1 says that the beneﬁts from exerting effort are higher than the cost.
Condition 1.2 says that exerting effort does not compensate its cost when risk
shifting occurs. Condition 1.3 says that the qualitative impact of σ over the dis-
tribution of cash ﬂows is more signiﬁcant than the impact of e. A link can be made
between condition 1.2 and 1.3 and the nature of the corporation. For instance it is
reasonable to assume that the risk shifting problem is more severe than the effort
problem for a ﬁnancial corporation4.
These three conditions allow us to rank the NPV of the projects as follows:
4Indeed, note that if eR > ψ + φ and σ < e, the social cost from mismanagement dominates the
social cost from risk shifting, and thus the order of the NPV is slightly modiﬁed:
NPV (eU , σM ) > NPV (eU , σU ) = NPV (eU , σD) >
> NPV (eD, σM ) > NPV (eD, σU ) = NPV (eD, σD)
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NPV (eU , σM) > NPV (eD, σM) > NPV (eU , σU) =(1.3.1)
= NPV (eU , σD) > NPV (eD, σU) = NPV (eD, σD)
Thus, the highest NPV is attained when ei = e and there is no modiﬁcation of risk
(σj = 0). This condition can be written in a more compact way as
NPV (e, 0) = maxe,σ {NPV (ei, σj)} ∀ i, j.
1.3.1. The implementation problem. As speciﬁed at the outset, the capital
structure is exogenously given and is composed by equity and debt, whose sharing
rules are standard and already agreed. Therefore P1’s indirect utility function will
be
V1 =
(
1
3
+ ei + σj
) (
R−D − tH1
)
+
(
1
3
− 2σj
) (
R
2
−D − tM1
)−
− (1
3
− ei + σj
)
tL1 − φj(σj)− S
where φj(σj) = {φU = φ, φM = 0, φL = φ}. P2’s indirect utility function will be in-
stead
V2 =
(
1
3
+ ei + σj
)(
D − tH2
)
+
(
1
3
− 2σj
)(
D − tM2
)−
−
(
1
3
− ei + σj
)
tL2 −−αD
Finally the manager’s indirect utility will be
U(ei, σj) =
∑
k=1,2
[(
1
3
+ ei + σj
)
tHk +
(
1
3
− 2σj
)
tMk +
(
1
3
− ei + σj
)
tLk
]
− ψi(ei)
For simplicity, I assume that the reservation utility of the agent is normalized to
zero.
Therefore, as opposed to the standard principal-agent model, in which the only
source of conﬂict is the hidden action problem, within a common agency frame-
work, a coordination problem between principals arises.
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Absent this problem, in a context of full information, the identiﬁcation of the First-
Best allocation and the subsequent implementation problem are straightforward.
Indeed, given (1.3.1), the allocation that will be reached under full information is
the one which corresponds to the action
aFB = (ei = eD = e, σj = σM = 0).
Under complete information, this action can be implemented through a contin-
gent transfer such that
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tH = tM = tL = ψ if ei = e and σj = 0
tH = tM = tL = 0 otherwise.
1.3.2. Incomplete information equilibria. I turn next to the problem of the
implementation of this First-Best allocation under incomplete information. How-
ever, one should distinguish two different contexts. In the ﬁrst, I look at the case
in which the two principals collude and act as a merged entity. This provides a
benchmark for the pure common agency context, which is obtained when the
principals act separately with different preferences over the projects. In the ﬁrst
case, the cooperative equilibrium arises when the capital structure is such that
the preferences of the principals are aligned. This happens when either capital
structure is sole equity or when the preferences of P2 are aligned to the ones of P1
through a ﬁnancial security technology such as convertible securities.
The common agency context arises when principals cannot collude. For instance,
this is the case of bank corporations, where depositors cannot write complex ﬁ-
nancial contracts in order to realign the preferences.
1.3.2.1. Coalitional equilibrium. For simplicity in this section I assume that
there is just one principal, the equity-holder, who fully owns the ﬁrm (S = I).
This case is equivalent to the merged principals case in the common agency lit-
erature, in which the principals collude with each other. Therefore we are in a
standard principal-agent model, with bi-dimensional moral hazard. The princi-
pal proposes a contract
{
tH , tM , tL
}
to the agent, which must induce the agent to
undertake effort, without modifying the structure of risk and satisfying the agent’s
individual rationality constraint. Thus, the principal’s problem becomes:
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(P)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
{tH ,tM ,tL}
(
1
3
+ e
) (
R− tH)+ 1
3
(
R
2
− tM)− (1
3
− e) tL − I
s.t. (ei = e, σj = 0) = argmaxU(ei, σj) (ICe,0)
U(ei = e, σj = 0) ≥ 0 (IRe,0)
In the next proposition I show that the equilibrium reached is unique and coin-
cides with the First-Best allocation.
Proposition1Under (A2) and (A4), collusion among the principals leads to a unique
monotonically increasing schedule of equilibrium transfers that implements the
ﬁrst best allocation aFB.
As shown in the appendix, the optimal schedule is as follows:
t∗ =
{
tH =
ψ
2e
; tM = 0; tL = − ψ
2e
}
.
Proof: see Appendix.
The result is in line with moral hazard implementation in absence of limited lia-
bility (Laffont and Martimort, 2002)5.
1.3.2.2. Competitive equilibria. I now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium
outcomes in a pure common agency setting. The two principals, P1 and P2, will
solve separately their own maximization problems, taking however into account
the transfers paid to the agent by the other principal. A signiﬁcant feature of the
problem is the intrinsic common agency nature of the game at hand. Indeed, both
principals have convergence of preferences over the effort, but, being the equity
payment schedule convex and the debt payment schedule concave, the principals
have opposite preferences over the risk structure of the project. To make things
interesting and better capturing the risk shifting problem, I imagine that the cor-
poration is so leveraged that the two conditions hold:
2.1 σD ≥ φ
2.2 σD − φ ≥ e(R−D)
5The case with limited liability is straightforward: setting tL = 0, one obtains tH = ψe and t
M = ψ2e .
This result, however, is obtained by simply shifting upward the schedule by ψ2e and leaves the agent
with a strictly positive rent.
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Condition 2.1 means that P1 wants to undertake over-investment and P2 wants
to undertake underinvestment. Condition 2.2 combined with 1.3, means that P1
prefers over-investment over effort and similarly P2 prefers underinvestment over
effort.
Hence, on the one hand P1has the following order of preferences over effort and
risk taking:
V1(eU , σU)  V1(eD, σU)  V1(eU , σM)  V1(eD, σM)  V1(eU , σL)  V1(eD, σL)
On the other, P2 has the following order of preferences:
V2(eU , σL)  V2(eD, σL)  V2(eU , σM)  V2(eU , σU)  V2(eD, σM)  V2(eD, σU).
Following Martimort (2006), I separate the problem considering the two possible
coalitions with each principal and the agent.
Therefore P1 wants to implement the action aP1 = (ei = e, σj = σ) which maxi-
mizes the payoff of his bilateral coalition with the agent. The program for P1 can
be written as:
(P1)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
{tH1 ,tM1 ,tL1 }
(
1
3
+ e + σ
) (
R−D − tH1
)
+
(
1
3
− 2σ) (R
2
−D − tM1
)
+
− (1
3
− e + σ) tL1 − φ− S
s.t. (ei = e, σj = σ) = argmaxU(ei, σj) (ICe,σ)
U(ei = e, σj = σ) ≥ 0 (IRe,σ)
Likewise, P2 wants to implement the action aP2 = (ei = e, σj = −σ) which maxi-
mizes the payoff of his bilateral coalition with the agent. The program for P2 can
be written as:
(P2)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
{tH2 ,tM2 ,tL2 }
(
1
3
+ e− σ) (D − tH2 )+ (13 + 2σ) (D − tM2 )+
− (1
3
− e− σ) tL2 − αD
s.t. (ei = e, σj = σ) = argmaxU(ei, σj) (ICe,−σ)
U(ei = e, σj = σ) ≥ 0 (IRe,−σ)
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Note that in (P1), the shareholder solves the problem taking as given tH2 , tM2 and tL2 ,
which are included in (ICe,σ) and (IRe,σ). Similarly in (P2), the debt-holder takes
as given tH1 , t
M
1 and t
L
1 , which are included in (ICe,−σ) and (IRe,−σ). As shown in the
next proposition, these strategies lead to a multiplicity of Bayes-Nash equilibria of
this game that can be attained through an inﬁnite combination of transfers.
Proposition 2 Under (A2) and (A4),
(1) each action of the agent can be induced by an inﬁnite set of transfers which
must satisfy:
(a) monotonicity at an aggregate level and
(b)
∑
k=1,2 t
H
k =
ψ
e
+
∑
k=1,2 t
L
k ;
(2) the intersection of the sets of solutions of (P1) and (P2) leads to amultiplic-
ity of Bayes-Nash equilibria, where the First-Best is still attainable.
Proof: see Appendix.
The Proposition highlights the core problem of common agency within the corpo-
ration. Indeed, as shown by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), in a context of public
common agency with conﬂicting principals and moral hazard, when setting the
transfers, a principal ﬁrst tries to undo the transfers of the principals, and then
sets the aggregate transfer.
In this context, the problem is less straightforward. Indeed, the principals have
conﬂicting objectives only as to the risk dimension of moral hazard. But since this
dimension dominates the effort one, the coordination problem cannot be over-
come. This leads to the multiplicity of equilibria problem, which is the most se-
vere under public agency.
1.3.3. Competitive equilibria reﬁnements. The results obtained in Proposi-
tion 2 are not conclusive from a policy perspective. Institutions can serve the
purpose of reﬁning the attainable equilibria. Therefore, I ﬁrst focus on the li-
ability regime that can be activated by the debt-holder in case of failure of the
project. The second and third remedies are suggested in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986). The second institution relies on the role of intermediate bodies between
the principals and the agent for implementing the optimal allocation through in-
direct mechanism designs. The third is the role of regulation in providing lower
and upper bound for the agent’s aggregate transfers.
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1.3.3.1. Allowing for negative transfersIntermediation. In the real world, debt-
holders are not allowed to negotiate the transfers with the agent. However, a di-
rectors’ duty to creditors may allow P2 for the payment of negative transfers: t2
in this case should be interpreted as the claim that debt-holders can have toward
the managers in case of default. The liability rule can, of course, be activated by
P2 only in the bad state (R˜ = 0). Then the contract offered by P2 must have the
following form: t2 :=
{
tH2 = 0; t
M
2 = 0; t
L
2 < 0
}
.
Given the restriction on t2, one gets the following condition of the transfers that
can be activated by P1:
tM1 = t
L
1 −
ψ
2e
< tL1 .
Thismeans that the payment schedule offered byP1 must be either non increasing
or nonmonotonic. SinceP1 can undowhatP2 has done, Proposition 2 still applies.
Therefore, ﬁduciary duties to creditors have the perverse effect of increasing the
likelihood that an over-investment equilibrium arises.
An improvement can be reached instead if the regulator establishes an upper and
lower bound for the aggregate level of transfers. In a more practical context, one
can assume that
∑
k=1,2
tHk ≤
ψ
2e
and
∑
k=1,2
tLk ≥ −
ψ
2e
.
This leads to a decentralization of the First-Best allocation, with
t1 :=
{
tH1 =
ψ
2e
; tM1 = 0, t
L
1 = 0
}
and
t2 :=
{
tH2 = 0; t
M
2 = 0, t
L
2 = −
ψ
2e
}
.
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Alternatively, the regulator can impose a ﬁxed payment for the agent. Of course,
this schedule would not give the agent the incentive to exert effort, but will pro-
vide her the incentive to take the efﬁcient level of risk. This solution will lead to
a second best, which may be desirable when the risk dominates dominates the
effort problem.
1.3.3.2. Intermediation. Turning to other institutional arrangements to restore
uniqueness of the equilibrium, I suggest to refer to an intermediate body in order
to solve the coordination problem. In the words of Bernheim and Whinston (1986,
p. 937) a “possibility is to bring in a risk-neutral intermediary: the principals each
individually offer outcome-contingent compensation to the intermediary, who, in
turn, makes some outcome-contingent offer to the agent (the principals are pro-
scribed from dealing with the agent directly)”.
Such a mechanism can be implemented through an Compensation Committee
whose members are Independent Directors, which sets the payment schedule of
the agent equal to
t∗ =
{
tH =
ψ
2e
; tM = 0; tL = − ψ
2e
}
.
However to make the members of the Committee unbiased, the corporation pays
the members a ﬁxed compensation and exempts them from liability.
1.4. Conclusion
This paper represent a preliminary attempt to model common agency within a
corporation with multi-dimensional moral hazard. It is shown that when the prin-
cipals have conﬂicting views over the level of risk that should be undertaken by the
manager, a multiplicity of equilibria arise. This is due to the fact that each prin-
cipal can “undo” what the other principal has done in terms of incentives to the
manager. Then possible institutional reﬁnements are suggested, and it is shown
that some institutional arrangements such as the set up of a Compensation Com-
mittee can restore Pareto efﬁciency in the economy.
This line of research can be extended in several ways. Indeed, a better way of
modeling the issue would be to assume that effort and risk taking are continu-
ous variables rather than discrete. Besides, equilibrium reﬁnements can be better
investigated under small variations of the model (such as assuming a risk averse
agent).
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Moreover, it would be worthwhile to explore a setting in which a regulator comes
into play. This could be done by assuming the existence of a a third principal (the
regulator) interactingwith both shareholders and debt-holders. Finally, extending
the model to the case in which a shareholder acts as a debt-holder within another
ﬁrm (and viceversa) could help in providing a link between the model and the
literature on agency costs, liquidity and business cycles.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The (ICe,0) is satisﬁed when the following two condi-
tions hold simultaneously:
(1.4.1) tH − tL ≥ ψ
e
and
(1.4.2) tH − tM = tM − tL.
(1.4.2)means that the payment schedulemust bemonotonic and symmetric. (1.4.1)
means that the payment schedule must be increasing. Together, (1.4.1) and (1.4.2)
imply that the payment schedule must be such that tH > tM > tL. Making bind-
ing (IRe,0) and because of (1.4.2), one can set tM = 0. Making (1.4.1) binding, one
ﬁnally gets the optimal schedule:
t∗ :=
{
tH =
ψ
2e
; tM = 0; tL = − ψ
2e
}
.
Note that, by construction, the over-investment problem is offset by the underin-
vestment problem. For this reason, the payment schedule is aimed at inducing
effort. Therefore, as shown in Hölmstrom (1979), under the realization of R/2, it
is reasonable to pay the agent just her reservation utility.
Proof of Proposition 2. Similarly to the case of Proof of Proposition 1, (ICe,σ)
in (P1) must satisfy the two conditions:
tH1 + t
H
2 − tL1 − tL2 ≥
ψ
e
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and
tH1 + t
H
2 − tM1 − tM2 ≥ tM1 + tM2 − tL1 − tL2 .
whereas (IRe,σ) can be rewritten as:
U(e, σ) =
∑
k=1,2
[(
1
3
+ e + σ
)
tHk +
(
1
3
− 2σ
)
tMk +
(
1
3
− e + σ
)
tLk
]
≥ ψ
In the same way, (ICe,−σ) in (P2) must satisfy the two conditions
tH1 + t
H
2 − tL1 − tL2 ≥
ψ
e
and
tH1 + t
H
2 − tM1 − tM2 ≤ tM1 + tM2 − tL1 − tL2 .
whereas (IRe,−σ) can be rewritten as:
U(e, σ) =
∑
k=1,2
[(
1
3
+ e− σ
)
tHk +
(
1
3
+ 2σ
)
tMk +
(
1
3
− e− σ
)
tLk
]
≥ ψ.
Therefore, the intersection of these constraints leaves us with just 2 equations in
6 unknowns:
(ICe,σ) ∩ (IRe,σ) ∩ (ICe,−σ) ∩ (IRe,−σ)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tH1 + t
H
2 − tM1 − tM2 = tM1 + tM2 − tL1 − tL2
tH1 + t
H
2 − tL1 − tL2 = ψe
Therefore one ends up with a parametric solution of transfers. Note that mono-
tonicity here is required at an aggregate level, while the transfers are not necessar-
ily monotonic at an individual level.
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CHAPTER 2
Myopia and paternalism in the design of social security schemes1
ABSTRACT. Several rationales have been provided in order to explain the role of
social security programs in modern welfare states. The current work investigates
the role of myopia under different assumptions. So far, the “myopia” argument
has been based on the fact that people fail in fully taking into account their future
behavior. This has led to a justiﬁcation for public pensions that is related to com-
pulsory savings. I analyze this literature in the light of the emerging trends in the
ﬁeld of behavioral economics. Moreover, in the last part of the work, I challenge
this view, claiming that the degree of myopia can be determined not only by psy-
chological biases, but also, to a certain degree, by a strategic commitment of some
individuals that aim at capturing the beneﬁts of redistribution towards myopics.
2.1. Introduction
Social security programs play a signiﬁcant role in modern welfare states. The total
expenditure for public pensions in the OECD Countries accounts on average for
7% of the GDP and its impact on total public spending is signiﬁcant as well: in
2005, it accounted for 20.3% in France, 24% in Germany and Italy, 18.3% in the
UK, 14.5% in the US and 30% in Japan2. These ﬁgures are deemed to increase in
the next decades, following an increasing trend that started after the SecondWorld
War and that is related to the issue of population aging.
The most common explanations which have been given in the public economics
literature to the existence of social security systems are four. First of all, social se-
curity systems act as a paternalistic device that forces individuals who suffer from
1I am greatly indebted to Prof. Helmut Cremer who ﬁrst raised my interest in the topic and pro-
vided constant advice and support during the research activity. I am also grateful to Philippe de
Donder, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Marianna Belloc for their helpful comments and remarks on
previous drafts and to all the participants to the XXVI European Association of Law and Economics
annual Conference, September 2009.
2Source: OECD (2007).
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myopia regarding future consumption paths to adequately save for their retire-
ment3.
Furthermore, they allow for redistribution of resources among generations and
among individuals belonging to the same cohort. The main advantage of this pol-
icy tool compared to income taxation in the pursue of redistribution goals is that
social security allows for redistribution of income on a lifetime, rather than an-
nual, basis4. This feature is helpful in avoiding the complications arising from a
system of recurring annual taxes5.
The third justiﬁcation for social security is the insurance motive. In the light of
this view, social security acts as an insurance device, providing “avenues for risk
sharing that are not otherwise available or are very costly in private markets” (Im-
rohoroglu et al., 2003, p. 745).
Sometimes a fourth rationale is provided, related to possible free-riding incen-
tives in the presence of altruism. According to Feldstein and Liebman (2002, p.
2253), “if individuals know that other members of the society are altruistic and
will provide for them if they reach old age without resources, then there will be an
incentive for people to undersave and take advantage of the good will of others.
This free-riding leads to an inefﬁcient outcome that can potentially be amelio-
rated with a compulsory program of old age assistance”. In the light of this, pub-
lic pension systems act as a tool against “rational prodigality”: social security is
viewed as a tool for avoiding strategic behavior on the behalf of some agents in
the economy which could impose excessive costs on other agents.
This work is primarily concerned with the “myopia” argument, although a pro-
posal is advanced for reconciling myopia and rational prodigality, under the claim
that the coexistence of agents that have different behaviors can lead to socially in-
efﬁcient outcomes.
3In the words of Kaplow (2008): “it is widely accepted that paternalistically motivated forced sav-
ings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retire-
ment systems”.
4Diamond (2004, p. 12) claims that since income taxation and social security “work on different
tax bases and provide payments at different times, there is room for each of them to contribute
despite the presence of the other”.
5Diamond (2003, p. 16) points out that this complications arise because of the links among sub-
sequent years, “links that occur because of savings, because of “human capital investments” that
affect earnings in later years and because of the ability to adjust the timing of the the realization of
the taxable income”.
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The argument according to which people suffer from myopia concerning saving
decisions is supported by empirical evidence. Several studies have highlighted
a signiﬁcant tendency in dropping consumption near retirement (Bernheim and
Rangel, 2005), which is quite puzzling for standard theories on consumption
smoothing and can be justiﬁed on psychological grounds6.
This justiﬁcation for paternalistic public intervention has been recently revived in
the literature on Behavioral Public Economics, which basically stresses the point
that psychological biases and failures in individual decision making can lead to
inefﬁcient choices that sometimes are ex post regretted by the agents. Public in-
tervention, the argument goes, is therefore needed to correct this kind of mis-
takes7. Hence, in the light of this literature, myopia provides a reason for social se-
curity programswhich is not related tomarket failures, but to failures in individual
decision-making. Accordingly, by imposing a program of compulsory savings, the
government leads individuals to internalize a negative externality (overconsump-
tion in the working life) that agents are imposing on their future selves.
However, beside the beneﬁts discussed above, a social security program, espe-
cially in the form of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, involves also costs for society.
In particular, these costs are related to the reduction in the level of social welfare
which results from the distortion of individual decisions concerning retirement
age, labor supply and the level of savings (Imrohoroglu et al., 2003).
The existence of these costs and the fact that returns on private savings tend to
dominate returns generated by the PAYG systemmay lead to conclude that the rise
of social security programs can be explained in a political economy framework as
a willingness to redistribute among generations (Cremer et al., 2007). However,
for the purposes of the present work, I take here a normative approach, focusing
on PAYG schemes8.
Rational prodigality, on the other hand, is a somewhat less developed argument
in the literature on social security. The literature can be traced back to the work
of Buchanan (1975) on the so called “Samaritan’s Dilemma” and to the contribu-
tion of Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) on intergenerational altruism. More recent
6See, however, Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006) for a different perspective.
7See Bernheim and Rangel (2005) for a general survey of the literature on Behavioral Public Eco-
nomics.
8For a comparison among funded systems and PAYG under hyperbolic discounting see Schwarz
and Sheshinski (2007).
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studies on the topic have been pursued by Homburg (2000, 2006), Fenge and von
Weizsäcker (2001) and von Weizsäcker (2003).
The work proceeds as follows: in section 2 the literature on time inconsistency is
discussed. In section 3 the optimal design of a linear social security scheme is con-
sidered. I start with a baseline model that is due to Feldstein (1985) with exoge-
nous labor supply and then I discuss some possible extensions, adding endoge-
nous labor supply, wage heterogeneity and early retirement issues. Furthermore,
I rely onCremer et al. (2008a) to extend the analysis to the case of partly redistribu-
tive (or Beveridgean) social security schemes. In section 4 the case of a non-linear
pension system is discussed. In Section 5 a model with time inconsistent choices
is sketched. Finally, section 6 provides suggestions for further research, claiming
the need to investigate the case for “rational myopia”, i.e. the situation in which
some agents strategically choose to discount the future at a low rate in order to
proﬁt from the redistributive aspect of the social security system.
2.2. How do we model myopia?
According to Imrohoroglu et al. (2003), there are basically two strands of literature
that have tried to model myopia in the context of social security. The ﬁrst stems
from the work of Feldstein (1985) and takes an overlapping generations (OLG) ap-
proach. In this type of models, individuals work in the ﬁrst period and retire in
the second and they have a utility function which is separable in consumption
in each period. Time inconsistency is introduced by assuming that the utility at-
tached to consumption in the second period is discounted at a rate that is lower
than the true one. Moreover, in the work of Feldstein (1985), myopia is assumed to
be also reﬂected in pension pessimism, meaning that the beneﬁts deriving from
the pension in the future are not fully taken into account in the ﬁrst period.
A second type of modeling, that stands much closer to the recent behavioral eco-
nomics literature, deals insteadwithmore general time-inconsistent consumption-
saving paths. Thesemodels extend the life cycle of the agents tomore than twope-
riods, trying in this way to capture the “systematic conﬂict between actors’ long-
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and short-term preference” (Laibson et al., 1998, p. 97)9. This preference reversal
property is modeled by adopting a utility function of the following form:
u(c0) + β
T∑
t=1
δtu(ct).
This utility function is characterized by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting of future
consumption patterns. This implies that with a quasi-hyperbolic discount func-
tion “e-vents in the near future are discounted at a higher implicit discount rate
than events in the distant future” (Laibson, 1997, p. 449). Therefore, the differ-
ence with discounting at an exponential rate lies in the fact that the hyperbolic
discount function is steeper in the short term, but ﬂatter in the long run (Fin-
ley and Caliendo, 2008). An interesting feature of this form of discounting lies in
the fact that it generates intertemporal conﬂicts among the different selves of the
same agent (Diamond and Koszegi, 2003). The current paper makes use of both
functions. In the ﬁrst part, the optimal pension schemes will be derived under
and OLG approach and then this framework will be enriched with more than two
periods and thus the quasi-hyperbolic utility will be employed in order to capture
time inconsistency.
2.3. The linear pension scheme model
I start with a simple model, with the aim of capturing the rationale justifying the
existence of compulsory PAYG social security schemes under the assumption of
myopia on the behalf of some individuals. Therefore, I have a two periods over-
lapping generations model in which individuals work in the ﬁrst period and retire
in the second. I assume that agents differ: 1) in the degree of myopia regarding fu-
ture consumption and 2) in their productivity. I assume that within the cohort of
the workers there are both myopic and rational individuals, whereas all the pen-
sioners are fully rational. In this way, I introduce the idea that people recognize
their past mistakes: individuals that have been myopics in the ﬁrst period regret
their consumption and saving choices when they retire. Moreover, each agent
has attached a productivity type, which is reﬂected in his wage w. Types are dis-
tributed according to a cumulative distribution F (w) over the support [w,w].
9A classical exempliﬁcation of this concept is provided by some evidence according to which peo-
ple tend prefer 1 euro today over 2 euro tomorrow, whereas they tend to reverse their preference if
the choice is between 1 euro in 100 days and 2 euro in 101 days.
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FIGURE 2.3.1. Intertemporal utility functions for myopics and life-cyclers
1c
2c
Life-cycler
Myope
I assume that there are two classes ofworkers: life-cyclers, whodiscount the future
at the true rate (βc = β = 1) and which represent a fraction πc of the workers,
and myopics, which discount the future at a lower rate (βm < β) and are in a
proportion of πm (with πm + πc = 1).
I assume that all agents in the economy share the same utility function, which is
separable in its arguments. In the ﬁrst period agents work an amount equal to l,
for which they receive a wage w, and consume c1, whereas in period two they just
consume c2, and their income is made of both private savings and the pension
they receive.
The interest rate for private savings, r > 0, is exogenously determined by a linear
storage technology, so that the pension system, which has a zero rate of return, is
dominated by the private savings technology10.
The most general structure of the pension for each agent is the following:
p = ατwl + (1− α)τ yˆ
where yˆ = E(w) =
´ w
w
wl(w;α, τ)dF (w) represents the average income. In this gen-
eral form, the pension is made of a Bismarckian component (the ﬁrst part of the
RHS) and of a redistributive (Beveridgean) part. The nature of the pension sys-
tem is therefore given by the value of α, which is usually called the Bismarckian
factor: if α = 1 the pension is actuarially fair and fully reﬂects the individual con-
tribution. If, however, α = 0, we have a ﬂat pension for everybody, reﬂecting the
10Note, in passing, that in this two periods model, the parameter for myopia can be expressed also
in terms of a discount rate rm > 0, so that βm = 11+rm < 1 = β.
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average contribution to the pension system.
In the light of this taxonomy, in the following table I characterize some OECD
Countries according to the characteristics of their public pension systems. In par-
ticular, I classify countries according to the generosity of the system and the de-
gree of redistribution they allow for.
TABLE 1. Pension systems in some OECD countries
Bismarckian Mixed Beveridgean
High
generosity
Finland,
Greece, Italy,
Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden
Austria,
Denmark
Low
generosity
France,
Germany
Belgium, Japan,
Norway
Australia,
Canada,
Ireland, New
Zealand, UK,
US
Source: OECD (2007). See the appendix for details.
As shown in Figure 2, the presence of a pension scheme affects the shape of the
intertemporal budget constraint. Since the individual is compelled to save in pe-
riod 1 an amount equal to τwl, the budget constraint will shift to the left. However,
this reduction in consumption set is (partially) compensated in period two by the
pension he receives. The idea underlying the adoption of a social security regime
is that the new shape of the budget constraint can allow myopic individuals to
attain higher levels of utility, although this increase comes at a cost for the life-
cyclers. If the overall gains of the myopics are greater than the loss suffered by the
life-cyclers, the pension system generates a net welfare gain.
An important remark lies in the acknowledgment of the fact that a system of com-
pulsory savings is the only available tool for correcting mistakes made by myopic
agents. Indeed, in principle, one would aim at “correcting” myopia, making my-
opic individuals apply the true discount rate β = 1. This intervention however is
not feasible since it would require full knowledge on the behalf of the government
of the preferences of each individual.
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In order to determine the optimal level of pensions and payroll taxes in the econ-
omy, I ﬁrst solve the utility maximization problem for each agent (both myopic
and fully rational):
max
c1,c2,s≥0
u(c1) + β
ju(c2)− v(l)
s.t. c1 + s ≤ (1− τ)wl
c2 ≤ (1 + r)s + ατwl + (1− α)τ yˆ
where j = m, c11. Then I make use of the values of consumption and saving to
solve the problem of the social planner and ﬁnd the optimal payroll tax.
2.3.1. A baseline Bismarckian model with ﬁxed labor supply. To introduce
the problem, I restrict for the moment the attention to a PAYG scheme with no re-
distribution among the pensioners (i.e. α = 0). Moreover, in this baseline model,
I treat labor supply as exogenous and set it equal to 1. This is the case which is
the closest to the original contribution by Feldstein (1985). However, in contrast
with this contribution, I exclude any form of pension pessimism and I add the as-
sumption that all pensioners, although myopics in the previous period, are fully
rational.
The problem faced by each agent (whether life-cycler or myopic) is the following:
max
c1,c2,s
u(c1) + β
ju(c2)
s.t. c1 + s ≤ (1− τ)w
c2 ≤ (1 + r)s + τw
s ≥ 0
where j=c, m. I assume that the utility function satisﬁes all the good properties: in
particular, I require that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. From the ﬁrst order condition I obtain:
(2.3.1) u′(cj1) = β
ju′(cj2)(1 + r)
11Note the requirement that private savings are positive. This is needed to rule out the possibility
of claiming future pensions as a collateral for loans in the ﬁrst period.
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Note that with a laissez-faire solution, life-cyclers attain the ﬁrst best, whereas
myopics do not, since they end up consuming too much in the ﬁrst period12. The
ﬁrst best could be achieved in this simple economy by subsidizing the savings of
all the myopic individuals for an amount equal to β−β
m
β
= r
m
1+rm
(i.e. their degree of
myopia compared to the life cyclers)13.
To see the effects of social security on savings, I compute the derivative of the
previous expression with respect to τ (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989). In this way I
measure the impact of the payroll tax on the amount of savings:
−u′′(cj1)
[
w +
dsj(τ)
τ
]
= (1 + r)βju′′(cj2)
[
(1 + r)
dsj(τ)
τ
+ w
]
which gives us the response of private savings to a variation in the payroll tax rate:
(2.3.2)
dsj(τ)
dτ
= −w
[
u′′(cj1) + (1 + r)β
ju′′(cj2)
]
u′′(cj1) + βju′′(c
j
2)(1 + r)
2
< 0.
This expression, which is always negative, measures the impact of the crowding
out effect on private savings by the social security scheme. Indeed, we can see
that the amount of savings is decreasing both in the degree of myopia and in the
relative rate of return of the PAYG system compared to the return on private sav-
ings14.
12Indeed, since β = 1, a life cycler sets the marginal utilities from consumption in the two periods
equal, whereas for a myopic we have u′(cM1 ) < u
′(cM2 ), so that he tends to consume more in the
ﬁrst period compared to the second.
13To see this, note that in the ﬁrst best I want (1.3.1) to be fulﬁlled by the myopics for the true
discount rate, β. Indeed the suggested subsidy achieves this goal:
u′(cm1 )
(
1− β − β
m
β
)
= βmu′(cm2 )(1 + r) ⇔ u′(cm1 ) = βu′(cm2 )(1 + r)
14To provide an illustration, consider the log-linear utility case u() = log(). Condition (1.3.1) gives
us an explicit value for savings:
(1− τ)w − sj(τ) = [(1 + r)s + τw][(1 + r)βj ] 1γ j = c,m
sj(τ) = w
[
1− τ
(
1 +
1
1 + r
1
1 + βj
)]
j = c,m
from which I can compute
dsj(τ)
dτ
= −
(
1 +
1
1 + r
1
1 + βj
)
.
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Turning to the social planner problem, I assume that he acts in a paternalistic
way, i.e. he maximizes the sum of individual utilities in absence of myopia, the
rationale being that the objective of the social planner is tomaximize ex post social
welfare. Retirees that have been myopic when young would ex post be grateful
to the social planner, since they regret their consumption choices made under
myopia.
Therefore the problem of the social planner is the following:
max
τ,p
ˆ w
w
∑
j=m,c
πj[u(c
j
1) + βu(c
j
2)]dF (w)
I can rewrite the problem as follows:
max
τ
L =
ˆ w
w
∑
j=m,c
πj
{
u[(1− τ)w − sj(τ)] + βu[(1 + r)sj(τ) + τw)]} dF (w)
Proceeding by pointwise maximization, I get the following expression:
(2.3.3)
dL
dτ
=
∑
j=m,c
πj
{
−u′(cj1)
[
w +
dsj(τ)
τ
]
+ βu′(cj2)
[
(1 + r)
dsj(τ)
τ
+ w
]}
= 0.
Before dealingwith a general solution to this problem, I consider two special cases.
Case 1: nomyopia (πm = 0). Consider ﬁrst the case inwhich there is nomyopia
in the economy and each agent acts in a fully rational way (i.e. πm = 0). In this
case I can state the following:
Proposition: 1: with a population of fully rational agents, a mandatory so-
cial security system with a strictly positive linear payroll tax always leads
to a decrease in social welfare.
Proof: see the appendix.
This result goes back to Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1958) and the intuition be-
hind it is that in order for the FOC to be fulﬁlled, and a positive payroll tax to arise,
I need the rate of return on private savings to be equal to the implicit returns of
the PAYG system. This means that, for the PAYG to be efﬁcient, the private savings
technology and the PAYG program should yield the same returns. In this case, the
2.3. THE LINEAR PENSION SCHEME MODEL 38
two alternatives would be perfect substitutes and the agent would be indifferent
among the two. However, given the assumptions, this can never be the case and
therefore the optimal payroll tax would be equal to zero.
Therefore, in the case of a population of fully rational agents the introduction of a
compulsory social security program always leads to a decrease in the overall level
of social welfare.
Case 2: full myopia (πm = 1). The previous result does not hold anymore if I
take the opposite extreme case of a population of myopic individuals (i.e. πm = 1).
In this case, I can derive a threshold in the degree of myopia that makes worth-
while to introduce a Bismarckian pension system:
Proposition: 2: under the assumption of a population of myopic individu-
als, the optimal linear pension is positive if and only if
(2.3.4) βm ≤ 1
1 + r
< 1
Proof: see the appendix.
This proposition implies that myopia has to be strong enough for a social security
system to be welfare improving.
Heterogeneous population. Turning now to the most general case of a popula-
tion of both life-cyclers and myopics, it is worth noting that while rational individ-
uals satisfy equation (2.3.1) for the true discount rate, this is not true for myopic
individuals. Let’s assume for the rest of the section that (2.3.4) holds. I can now
solve (2.3.3) to obtain
dL
dτ
=
∑
j=m,c
πju
′(cj2)
{
(β − βj)(1 + r)ds
j(τ)
τ
+
[
β − βj(1 + r)]w} = 0.
After some rearrangements of the previous expression, we obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition: 3: under (2.3.4), an optimal Bismarckian social security system
leads to an increase in the social welfare if and only if the proportion of
myopics in the population is higher than γ:
πm
πc
≥ γ ≥ 0
where γ = 1u′(cm2 )
u′(cc2)
[
( 1+r1+rm )
2
u′′(cm2 )−u′′(cm1 )
]≤ 1.
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Proof: see the appendix.
Therefore, in this simple setting, I have shown that the PAYG system, although
dynamically inefﬁcient, can lead to a Pareto improvement if the losses borne by
the life-cyclers through the social security scheme are more than compensated by
the gains of the myopics15. Two conditions are needed for this result to hold: the
myopic individuals have to be sufﬁciently numerous in the population and their
degree of myopia has to be sufﬁciently high.
2.3.2. A baseline Beveridgean model with ﬁxed labor supply. I now turn to
the opposite case of a fully Beveridgean system (α = 1). This implies that the
pension system serves a pure redistributive goal.
While (2.3.1), i.e. the solution to the problem of the individuals (both life-cyclers
and myopics), remains the same16, the problem of the social planner becomes the
following:
max
τ
L =
ˆ w
w
∑
j=m,c
πj
{
u[(1− τ)w − sj(τ)] + βu[(1 + r)sj(τ) + τwˆ)]} dF (w)
The problem is similar to the previous one, however here there are two redistribu-
tive concerns: indeed, the social planner wants to redistribute from life-cyclers to
myopics and from rich individuals to poor individuals. To see this, I write the FOC
for the previous expression, where, to simplify the notation I make use of expec-
tations rather than integrals:
dL
dτ
=
∑
j=m,c
πjE
{[
(1 + r)
(
β − βj) dsj
dτ
+ βwˆ − (1 + r)βjw
]
u′(cj2)
}
= 0.
Focusing on the expression within the square brackets, I see that it is composed
of three terms. The ﬁrst one, which is zero for the life-cyclers and negative for the
15An extension of the paper by Feldstein has been proposed by Andersen and Bhattacharya (2008),
and it is related to the attempt of endogenizing the interest rate, by assuming a neoclassical storage
technology. The rationale for this approach can be found in Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
16However, the response of private savings to a variation in the tax rate becomes:
dsj(τ)
τ
= −u
′′(cj1)w + (1 + r)β
ju′′(cj2)wˆ
u′′(cj1) + βju′′(c
j
2)(1 + r)2
< 0.
which is coincides with (2.3.2) only for the individual with a productivity equal to the average of
the population.
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myopics, is similar to the one in theBismarckian case, andmeasures the distortion
on savings. The second and third term should be analyzed together, since they
measure the redistribution operated through the system. Indeed, assuming (2.3.4)
to hold, we can have different cases, which are summarized in the following table.
dL/∂τ Myopic (βm ≤ 1
1+r
)
Life-cycler (βc = 1)
(1 + r)w > wˆ ≶ 0 <0
wˆ > (1 + r)w >0 >0
Contrary to the previous case, we observe that in a pure Beveridgean system some
life-cyclers gain from the the social security scheme: in particular, the poorer
among them, i.e. the ones with a wage lower than wˆ/(1 + r).
Therefore, for a Beveridgean pension scheme to be welfare increasing, we need
that the gains obtained by the myopics and the poor can compensate the losses of
the rich (either life-cyclers or myopics).
2.3.3. A general model with ﬁxed labor supply. I now turn to the more gen-
eral case of a mixed pension scheme in which both a Bismarckian and a Bev-
eridgean component coexist. The problem for the individuals is the one that I in-
troduced at the outset of this section. The main difference with the speciﬁcations
treated so far is that now the amount of savings depends not only on the payroll
tax rate, but also on α, the contributory (or Bismarckian) factor: sj = sj(α, τ).
Therefore, along with the usual saving response to the tax rate, i.e. ∂sj/∂τ , I have
also the response to the contributory factor:
∂sj
∂α
= − β
ju′′(cj2)τ(w − wˆ)
βj(1 + r)2u′′(cj2) + u′′(c1)
 0 if w  wˆ
which is not necessarily negative. It decreases with productivity and it is greater
the higher the degree of myopia.
The problem of the social planner is now:
max
α,τ
L =
ˆ w
w
∑
j=c,m
πj
{
u[(1− τ)w − sj] + βu[(1 + r)sj + + ατw + (1− α)τwˆ)]} dF (w)
which leads to the following FOCs:
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∂L
∂τ
=
∑
j=m,c
πjE
{
u′(cj2)
[
(1 + r)
(
β − βj) ∂sj
∂τ
+
[
βα− βj(1 + r)]w]+(2.3.5)
+ u′(cj2) [(1− α)βwˆ]
}
= 0
(2.3.6)
∂L
∂α
=
∑
j=m,c
πjE
{[
(1 + r)
(
β − βj) ∂sj
∂α
+ βτ(w − wˆ)
]
u′(cj2)
}
= 0
From (2.3.6), bearing inmind that βm can be rewritten as (1+rm)−1, I get an explicit
expression for the tax rate
(2.3.7) τ = −πm
1+r
1+rm
rmE
{
∂sm
∂α
u′(cm2 )
}
∑
πjcov
[
w, u′(cj2)
] ≥ 0
where, as in Cremer et al. (2008a), the covariance term represents the redistribu-
tive objective and is generally negative17.
2.4. A non linear model
I now move to the case in which we want to introduce in the system a non-linear
pension scheme. There are basically two ways in which the literature has tried
to tackle the issue of myopia under non-linear pension schedules. The ﬁrst one,
which is developed in Diamond (2003) introduces myopia as affecting the incen-
tive compatibility constraint of the worker that mimics other types. Types are het-
erogeneous only with respect to their productivity: a myopic worker, therefore,
“perceives a change in ﬁrst-period consumption, but not in the second” (Dia-
mond, 2003, p. 35). The second way is developed in Cremer et al. (2008b) and
in Tenhunen and Tuomala (2007). I rely on both approaches, giving a different
interpretation to the incentive compatibility constraints proposed by Diamond
(2003).
We are therefore in a setting with multidimensional asymmetric information, with
individuals differing both in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Accord-
ingly, the economy is composed of four types of agents, each of whom represents
a fraction of the population in the economy equal to πi, with i=1,...,4 (see ﬁgure).
17An explicit expression for Bismarckian parameter can be found in the appendix.
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Low
productivity
High
productivity
Myopic π1 π2
Life-cycler π3 π4
While myopia is modeled as in the ﬁrst part, to keep things simple, I assume pro-
ductivity to be discrete. Thus, each type has a skill level w such that his earnings
are equal to yi = wili, where wi is the wage and li the labor supply. Note that wi can
now take only two values, high or low, so that w1 = w3 < w2 = w4. Labor supply,
however, differs across types because of the cross effect of myopia and productiv-
ity, so that each type ends up with different earnings.
Utility functions are similar to the ones we have been dealt with so far, although in
this section I slightly modify the notation. Hence, the utility function of a generic
type i will have the following form, which I write in terms of observable variables:
Ui = u(ci) + βiv(di) + z
(
1− yi
wi
)
where ci is the consumption in the ﬁrst period, di is the consumption in the second
and yi are the earnings. In this simple framework, I assume that the government
observes the earnings of the agent and taxes her in period one with a non-linear
tax ti(yi). In the next period, the government pays the pension, which is partly
redistributive:
pi(yi) = αti(yi) + (1− α)
4∑
j=1
πjtj(yj).
The budget constraint for the government is derived from the intertemporal bud-
get constraint for the individuals:
⎧⎨
⎩ci = yi − ti(yi)di = pi(yi)
Hence the budget constraint for the government can be written as:
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∑
i
πi (ci + di − yi) ≤ 0.
2.4.1. First best. The ﬁrst best allocation can be derived under the assump-
tion of full information on the behalf of the government.The problem, therefore,
writes as follows.
max
ci,di,li≥0
L =
∑
i
πi
[
u(ci) + βv(di) + z
(
1− yi
wi
)
− μ (ci + di − yi)
]
Note that I keep the assumption of a paternalistic social planner, so that the dis-
count rate is equal to the one of the life-cyclers. The FOCs lead to
(2.4.1) u′(ci) = βv′(di)
with
(2.4.2)
z′
(
1− yi
wi
)
u′(ci)
= wi
Now, while (2.4.1) means that the level of consumption is equalized across types,
(2.4.2) implies that lower productivity leads to lower labor supply.
2.4.2. Second Best. I assume that individual productivity and the degree of
myopia are not observable. Therefore, I have to add to the problem the incentive
compatibility constraints, which, since we are dealing with a multidimensional
problem, are quite numerous (12) in the case at hand. When writing the con-
straints, however, I do not consider the second period consumption. This is due
to the fact that at the beginning of the second period, i.e. when the government
pays the pension, the consumption of the second period is not yet observed and
so I have to rely on the observation of the ﬁrst period consumption and earnings
to determine the types. This is a reinterpretation of the model by Diamond (2003)
and represents one of the main differences with Cremer et al. (2008b).
Hence, the Lagrangian for the problem at hand can be rewritten as:
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max
ci,di,li≥0
L =
∑
i
πi
[
u(ci) + βv(di) + z
(
1− yi
wi
)
− μ (ci + di − yi)
]
+
∑
i
∑
j =i
λij
[
Ui − Uˆj
]
where the government maximizes under the true discount rate, and the generic IC
Ui ≥ Uˆj is:
u(ci) + z
(
1− yi
wi
)
≥ u(cj) + z
(
1− yj
wi
)
note that an individual can mimic ﬁrst period consumption and earnings, but not
the degree of myopia and productivity, which are idiosyncratic features of each
individual.
The FOCs of the above problem are therefore:
∂L
∂ci
= u′(ci)
[
πi +
∑
j =i
λij −
∑
j =i
λji
]
= πiμ(2.4.3)
∂L
∂yi
= z′
(
1− yi
wi
)[
πi +
∑
j =i
λij
]
−
∑
j =i
λji
wi
wj
z′
(
1− yi
wj
)
= πiwiμ
Combining the two equations I get
(2.4.4)
z′
(
1− yi
wi
)
u′(ci)
=
wi
ρ
where
ρ =
πi +
∑
j =i λij −
∑
j =i λji
wi
wj
z′
(
1− yi
wj
)
z′
(
1− yi
wi
)
πi +
∑
j =i λij −
∑
j =i λji
with ρ ∈ [0, 1]
Note that a priori nothing can be said on which constraints are binding, so that I
cannot identify in advance who will mimic the behavior of the other agents. How-
ever, it is quite reasonable to assume that there will be at least 5 constraints that
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bite: this condition can be obtained by the hypothesis according to which any life-
cycler will try to mimic a myopic individual in order to obtain a higher pension,
while any rich individual will try to mimic the poor.
The termdenoted by ρ, represents the informational rent, in terms of lower payroll
taxes or higher pensions, that the government has to leave to the mimickers in
order to make them reveal their type.
Note also that, since we get rid of second period consumption, the discount rate
here is not explicitly involved, although it is reﬂected in the earnings of the indi-
viduals.
2.5. A two-period model with time inconsistency
I now want to model a situation in which the agent is time-inconsistent with re-
spect to her choices regarding labor supply, in order to study the impact of time
inconsistent choices on the design of optimal pension schemes. I am indeed
interested in the behavior of “people who have self-control problems but real-
ize this and behave according to it” (Diamond and Koszegi 2003, p. 1840). This
time inconsistent behavior generates an intertemporal conﬂict among the differ-
ent selves.
The framework is therefore inspired by Laibson (1997), although the model is re-
stricted to two periods only. The main adjustment consists of adding a compul-
sory social security scheme. Moreover, instead of dealing with saving behavior, as
Laibson does, I look at the effects on labor supply.
The model is as follows. An agent lives for two periods. In the ﬁrst one she works,
in the second she retires and perceives a pension based on her contribution in the
ﬁrst period. The pension is of the general form p = ατw + (1 − α)τ yˆ. There are
no private savings and I assume the generosity of the system and the degree of re-
distribution to be exogenous, with τ, α ∈ (0, 1). A main difference with the models
seen so far is that now the agent can decide to keep working in the second period,
while still receiving her pension. Therefore, in period two her budget constraint
will be c2 = p + wl2. This feature of the model is aimed at capturing the idea that
individuals in the second period can found themselves having worked too little in
the past and hence they need to work more in order to guarantee themselves an
adequate level of consumption.
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I assume that the agent is time inconsistent - in the sense that she has self-control
problemswhich are acknowledged in the secondperiod - but sophisticated,mean-
ing that the agent is smart enough to anticipate in period 1 that she is going to
regret her choice in the next period. This leads the self in period 1 (self 1) to enter
in a game with the self in period 2 (self 2). An alternative formulation of the prob-
lem, which I report in the appendix, would be to assume naivete on the behalf of
the agent, meaning that in period 1 self 1 naively assumes that self 2 will follow her
decisions. The instantaneous utility function is of the CRRA class in consumption,
and in particular I assume it to be logarithmic. The disutility from labor instead is
linear.
Before dealing with the agent’s problem, let’s look at how a life-cycler would solve
the problem. This is also the best allocation in the economy, and therefore I refer
to it as the life-cycler allocation.
2.5.1. Life-cyclers. A life-cycler discounts the future at the true rate, which I
pose for simplicity equal to 1. The problem is therefore:
V c(w; τ) = max
c1,c2,l1,≥0,l2≥0
log(c1) + log(c2)− l1 − l2
s.t. c1 = (1− τ)wl1
c2 = p(l1) + wl2
Note that the pension she receives in period twodepends exclusively on the amount
of labor supplied in the ﬁrst period. Therefore the optimal quantities of labor in
the two periods are
lc1 =
1
1− ατ ≥ 0
and
lc2 = 1−
ατ
1− ατ − (1− α)τ
yˆ
w
and the latter is positive iff
w ≥ kyˆ
where k = 1−ατ
1−2ατ (1− α)τ ≥ 1.
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Note that labour supplies in both periods are negatively related to the degree of re-
distribution of the system. Moreover, in period two labor supply is strictly positive
only for highly productive individuals.
2.5.2. Sophisticated agents. Assume instead that individuals are myopic and
ma-ke time inconsistent choices. When the agents are sophisticated, they solve a
dynamic game in which the players are the two selves across periods. Since I am
looking for a subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies, I
proceed by backward induction looking at the best response of self 2, for a given
level of labor supply l1.
The problem faced in period 2 by self 2 is then:
max
c2,l2
log(c2)− l2
s.t. c2 = p(l1) + wl2
from which I obtain self 2’s best response to l1:
l2(l1) = 1− p
w
= 1− ατl1 − (1− α)τ yˆ
w
Now, moving backward to period 1, given the best response of self 2, self 1 solves
V m(w; τ) = max
c1,l1
log(c1)− l1 + β [log(c2)− l2(l1)]
s.t. c1 = (1− τ)wl1
c2 = p(l1) + wl2(l1)
Computing the FOC
1
l1
+
β
p + wl2
[
dp(l1)
dl1
+ w
dl2(l1)
dl1
]
− 1− βdl2(l1)
dl1
= 0
we note that substituting for the values of dp/dl1 and dl2/dl1 in the previous ex-
pression, the term in square brackets disappears. Therefore we obtain that labor
supply in period 1 is:
lm1 =
1
1− βατ < l
c
1
and recursively I can compute the equilibrium choice for self 2:
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lm2 = 1−
ατ
1− βατ − (1− α)τ
yˆ
w
> lc2
Note here that the agent tends to work too little in the ﬁrst period and too much
in the second, compared to the life-cycler. Moreover, an interesting feature of this
model lies in the fact that, in contrast with the previous case, a social planner who
ﬁxes the values ofα and τ at the outset of the gamewill never succeed in correcting
the mistakes of the individual. An important consequence of this is the following
proposition:
Proposition 4: for β < 1 the life-cycler allocation can be attained only in ab-
sence of a social security scheme (i.e. when τ = 0).
Let us now turn to the two extreme case cases of purely Bismarckian or Beveridgean
pension schemes.
Under a purely Bismarckian scheme (α = 1), labor supply reaches the maximum
attainable value in the ﬁrst period. However, the amount of labor supplied in pe-
riod 2 depends on the productivity of the individual.
Under a fully Beveridgean scheme (α = 0), instead, the life-cycler allocation is
attainable (indeed lm1 = l
c
1 and l
m
2 = l
c
2 = 1 − ατ yˆw ), although the level of labor
supply in the ﬁrst period is minimum.
In order to better clarify the previous statements, I perform a simple calibration
exercise, representing in the ﬁgures below the labour supply values for different
values of α18. The ﬁrst case is one of a relatively rich individual (I set yˆ/w = 0.5).
18The values of the parameters are: β = 0.6 and τ = 0.4.
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In the second ﬁgure instead I represent the case of a relatively poor individual
(yˆ/w = 3).
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It is worth to note that while labor supply in period one is increasing in the Bis-
marckian coefﬁcient, labor supply in period 2 can be alternatively increasing or
decreasing in α according to the productivity of the individual.
2.6. Myopia as a result of the pension system
The aim of this work was to offer a review on the recent literature on optimal
pension schemes under myopia. I showed that under the assumption of a pa-
ternalistic social planner, welfare improving PAYG schemes involve redistribution
of resources from life-cyclers to myopic agents. In this last section, I suggest that
myopia can be seen not only as a psychological bias, but also as a strategic tool.
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So far, the “rational prodigality” and myopia arguments have been dealt with sep-
arately. However, while in the case of myopia the literature has reached quite well
deﬁned conclusions, the literature on rational prodigality is less conspicuous and
more ambiguous in its results.
Rational prodigality has been studied in a series of papers which have based their
analysis on the existence of some survival wage or mean-tested pensions. In par-
ticular, Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) justify the existence of mean-tested pensions
in a twoperiods gamewith altruistic individuals. Fenge and vonWeizsäcker (2001)
claim the efﬁciency of mean-tested linear pension schemes, as a tool for avoiding
moral hazard by the individuals with lower productivity. This analysis has been
further extended to non-linear pensions in von Weizsäcker (2003).
Homburg (2000, 2006), instead, claims that in many circumstances, the losses cre-
ated by a pension system are larger than the ones generated by the free-riding
behavior of the prodigals in the society and therefore the removal of compulsory
savings schemes leads to a welfare improvement.
In my opinion, some future research could aim at reconciling these approaches
in a unique framework. More precisely, an attempt could be made to model the
concept according to which myopia on the behalf of the individuals can be due to
the availability of public resources for the old age. Basically, this approach aims
at investigating the causes underlying myopia and in so doing, it relates them to
the presence of some resources in the second period which are not related to the
contribution in the ﬁrst period.
Therefore, I support the view according to which myopia is, at least partly, not a
psychological bias, but rather a rational response to a generous pension system
(Findley and Caliendo, 2008). Indeed, if at the time when people work, they know
that, no matter what their current behavior is in terms of savings and labor, they
will receive some pension when old, they will discount this in the present not only
through a reduction in savings, but also by putting a lower weight on future con-
sumption. Therefore, the social security system, through redistribution, will gen-
erate myopia in the system, thus leading to an increase in the dead-weight loss
created by the pension system.
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To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that tries to develop this approach
with a formal model is Pestieau and Possen (2008), which derives an optimal non-
linear pension scheme for an economy populated by myopic and prodigal indi-
viduals. Their model however takes myopia and prodigality as idiosyncratic fea-
tures of some individuals. New insights can be derived from the development of
a theory of “rational myopia”, endogenizing the decision on the rate at which dis-
counting the future.
Appendix
Pension systems in some OECD countries:
Country
Progressivity
index
Gross
replacement
rates by
earnings
Australia 73.1 47.9
Austria 30.4 80.1
Belgium 58.8 40.7
Canada 86.6 49.5
Denmark 59.3 83.6
Finland 7.6 63.4
France 24.6 51.2
Germany 26.7 39.9
Greece 2.6 95.7
Ireland 100 38.2
Italy 3.1 67.9
Japan 46.9 36.8
Netherlands 0 .0 81.7
New Zealand 100 46.8
Norway 37.4 60
Spain 18.8 81.2
Sweden 12.9 63.7
United Kingdom 81.1 34.4
United States 40.9 43.6
Source: OECD (2007).
Proof of proposition 1: In this case (2.3.3) can be rewritten as
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dL
dτ
= −u′(cc1)
[
w +
dsc(τ)
τ
]
+ βu′(cc2)
[
(1 + r)
dsc(τ)
τ
+ w
]
= 0
⇐⇒ dL
dτ
= βu′(cc2)
{
−(1 + r)
[
w +
dsc(τ)
τ
]
+ (1 + r)
dsc(τ)
τ
+ w
}
= 0
⇐⇒ 1 + r = 1
which contradicts the assumption that r > 0.
Proof of proposition 2: Combining (1.3.1) and (2.3.3) one gets the optimal
savings response (Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2008):
(2.6.1)
dsm(τ)
τ
= − β − β
m(1 + r)
(β − βm)(1 + r)w
This expression should be confrontedwith (2.3.2), which represents the individual
private savings response. This ensure that the problems of the myopic individual
and of the social planner are compatible. Equalizing (2.3.2) with (2.6.1), one ob-
tains
u′′(c1) + βmu′′(c2)(1 + r)
u′′(c1) + βmu′′(c2)(1 + r)
=
β − βm(1 + r)
(β − βm)(1 + r) .
Now, since the expression on the LHS and the denominator of the RHS are both
positive, for the equality to hold itmust be that β−βm(1+r) = 0. As a consequence,
if βm > β
1+r
, the social security program is always welfare decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 3: The formula in the text can be simpliﬁed as follows,
with β = 1:
−πcu′(cc2)rw + πmu′(cm2 )
{
(1− βm)(1 + r)ds
m(τ)
τ
+ [1− βm(1 + r)]w
}
in this way we can see that life-cyclers always lose in the presence of a social secu-
rity program, whereas myopics gain if and only if
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[1− βm(1 + r)]w ≥ −
[
(1− βm)(1 + r)ds
m(τ)
τ
]
(i.e. if the gains deriving from receiving the pension exceed the reduction on sav-
ings). The ﬁrst step is to show that this condition holds. Indeed, by substituting
(2.3.2) into the previous expression one obtains
1− βm(1 + r) ≥ (1− βm)(1 + r) u
′′(cm1 ) + (1 + r)β
mu′′(cm2 )
u′′(cm1 ) + (1 + r)2βmu′′(c
m
2 )
⇐⇒
(1 + r)2βm
2 ≥ u
′′(cm1 )
u′′(cm2 )
if one substitutes βm = 1
1+rm
into the previous expression one gets:
(
1 + r
1 + rm
)2
≥ u
′′(cm1 )
u′′(cm2 )
we see that for appropriate speciﬁcations of the utility function, the condition is
always satisﬁed.
Now we have to compare this net gain with the loss suffered by the life-cyclers:
−πcu′(cc2)rw + πmu′(cm2 )
{
(1− βm)(1 + r)ds
m(τ)
τ
+ [1− βm(1 + r)]w
}
≥ 0
(1− βm)(1 + r)ds
m(τ)
τ
+ [1− βm(1 + r)]w ≥ πc
πm
u′(cc2)
u′(cm2 )
rw
πm
πc
≥ 1
u′(cm2 )
u′(cc2)
[(
1+r
1+rm
)2
u′′(cm2 )− u′′(cm1 )
] ≥ 0
and since the term within the square brackets is positive and the ratio u
′(cm2 )
u′(cc2)
is
greater than 1, the previous expression implies that it is sufﬁcient to have a posi-
tive proportion of myopics in the population for a welfare improving pension sys-
tem to arise.
Explicit expression for the Bismarckian parameter for the linear ﬁxed labor
supply model: From (2.3.5) I get an explicit expression for the Bismarckian pa-
rameter:
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α =
[
πcr − πm 1+r1+rm
]
E {wu′(cc2)}+ πm r
m(1+r)
1+rm
E
{
∂sj
∂τ
u′(cj2)
}
∑
πjcov
[
w, u′(cj2)
] +
+
πmwˆE
{
u′(cj2)
}− πccov [w, u′(cL2 )]∑
πjcov
[
w, u′(cj2)
]
Naive agents with commitment: A naive agent with commitment maximizes
her intertemporal utility in period 1, knowing that in the next period self 2 will
choose the allocation decided by self 1 in period one. Therefore the problem is
V n(w; τ) = max
c1,c2,l1,l2
log(c1)− l1 + β [log(c2)− l2]
s.t. c1 = (1− τ)wl1
c2 = p(l1) + wl2
and the solution is:
ln1 = l
c
1 =
1
1− ατ ≥ 0
ln2 = β −
ατ
1− ατ − (1− α)τ
yˆ
w
≤ lc2
which is positive iff
w ≥ k′yˆ
with k′ = 1−ατ
β−(1+β)ατ (1− α)τ
In this setting, we observe that the amount of labor supplied in period 1 coincides
with the one of the life-cycler, however, because of myopia, now less people work
in t=2.
Naive agents without commitment: If there is no way to commit, self 1 will
update her choice in period 2. However, this is not anticipated by self 1, so that
her problem will be:
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V nn(w; τ) = max
c1,c2,l1,l2
log(c1)− l1 + β [log(c2)− l2]
s.t. c1 = (1− τ)wl1
c2 = p(l1) + wl2
so that
lnn1 = l
c
1 =
1
1− ατ ≥ 0
However, in period 2, self 2 plans are updated:
max
c2,l2
log(c2)− l2
s.t. c2 = p(l1) + wl2
l1 =
1
1− ατ
and the amount of labor supplied in both periods will coincide with the one of a
life-cycler:
lnn2 = l
c
2 = 1−
ατ
1− ατ − (1− α)τ
yˆ
w
.
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CHAPTER 3
Regulation and investment incentives for broadband access
networks1
ABSTRACT. A ﬁerce debate on how to stimulate investments in the access network
is currently taking place in the EU. On one side, it has been argued that the pro-
cess which has led during the past decades to the opening of the markets to new
competitors is now over. Accordingly, no further rules and regulations should be
applied to new (private) infrastructures. On the opposite side stand those who
fear that a complete deregulation of the industry could lead to a process of con-
solidation of the markets and in the end to a reduction in the consumer surplus.
At the European level, this debate has conﬂicted with the review of the regulatory
framework and has led to new regulatory proposals both from the Commission
and from NRAs. In the ﬁrst part of the work the incentives underlying the adop-
tion of NGANs under different regulatory regimes are investigated. An optimal
policy mix is sketched, taking both dynamic and static efﬁciency concerns into
account. In the second part, the paper provides new empirical evidence on the
European broadband ﬁxed markets with respect to both broadband adoption and
investment choices by the market players, with the aim of assessing the effective-
ness of the new EU regulatory framework of 2002 and to draw some lessons for the
NGNs context.
1This chapter has been partly published in Promoting New Telecom Infrastructures: Markets, Poli-
cies and Pricing, Morten Falch and Jan Markendahl (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2010. I am grateful to An-
drea Renda for his helpful comments and support. I also thank Carlo Cambini, Angelo Castaldo,
Morten Falch, Luigi Franzoni, Franco Micoli, Scott Wallsten and two anonymous referees for their
comments on previous drafts. Special thanks go to Flavia Barca at the Institute for Media Econom-
ics and all participants at the Fondazione Rosselli workshop on “Next Generation Networking”,
Rome, 19 June 2008, at the SIDE Fourth Annual Conference, Bologna, 6-7 November 2008 and the
SIDE Fifth Annual Conference, Florence, 4-5 December 2009. The second part of this chapter has
been undertaken as part of the STAREBEI programme at European Investment Bank. I am greatly
indebted to Dr. Harald Gruber at EIB for his helpful comments and support. Special thanks go to
all participants at the seminars held at EIB. Financial support from EIB is gratefully acknowledged.
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3.1. Introduction
The ﬁxed line telecommunications industry has experienced new challenges in
the recent years. The increasing deployment of new technologies and the emer-
gence of new regulatory paradigms are two of the main factors which are cur-
rently leading the telecommunications industry towards what has been called an
“identity crisis”(OECD, 2006, p.1). Indeed, a trend towards a wider adoption of IP-
based technologies and applications has been observed in most of the telecom-
municationsmarkets during the recent years. Furthermore, this phenomenonhas
pressed the industry towards a growing convergence with wireless technologies
and multimedia.
It is clear that in order to compete in an effective way in the long run, new in-
vestments are required for upgrading legacy networks. Indeed, existing public
switched telephone networks (PSTNs) cannot support the increasing bandwidth
requirements of new IP based applications.
Thus, the main question for policy-makers has become how to stimulate long-
term investments, preventing at the same time a re-monopolization of the telecom-
municationsmarkets fromhistorical operators. A growing debate on this topic has
recently spurred, because of the investments announcements made by some op-
erators and also because of the ongoing review of the regulatory framework pro-
posed by the European Commission.
On one side, it has been argued that the process which has led during the past
decades to the opening of the markets to new competitors is now over. Accord-
ingly, no further rules and regulations should be applied to new (private) infras-
tructures. Indeed, keeping regulation still in place – it is argued – would ultimately
lead investors to give up plans of upgrading their networks and introducing new
services on the market. This is the ratio underlying the US approach, where since
2003 a regulatory forbearance is in place for ﬁbre infrastructures: accordingly,
those operators who decide to invest in next-generation access networks (NGANs)
are not required to share their networks with competitors anymore. On the oppo-
site side stand those who fear that a complete deregulation of the industry could
lead to a process of consolidation of the markets and, in the end, to a reduction in
the consumer surplus. A similar outcome would clearly nullify all the progresses
achieved during the last decade.
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As it has been pointed out by OECD (2008a), within an NGAN framework, govern-
ment can take several actions in order to promote investments by market players.
Indeed, the development of new high-bandwidth infrastructures and technolo-
gies is considered beneﬁcial for social welfare, and delays in their deployment can
give rise to substantial social costs (Guthrie, 2006). Therefore, it has been acknowl-
edged that the government can enact several measures ranging from facilitating
the roll-out of networks through a reduction of the administrative burden, to reg-
ulating the market and, in some circumstances, to investing in ventures when the
roll-out is not economically feasible for private investors (OECD, 2008a). However,
the beneﬁts deriving from the adoption of new technologies can take place only
in workable competitive markets (Clark, 1940). Accordingly, in playing its game,
the government has to ensure both competition and returns from investments.
Hence, this paper investigates the question of how long-run investments in the
ﬁxed-line segment can be stimulated keeping a competitive market structure.
The work is made of nine sections. Firstly, an overview on current NGANs im-
plementation is provided. Then, after a review of the reasons underlying public
intervention in broadband markets, the problem of underinvestment is outlined.
In this section it will be showed that the interaction of many factors – ﬁrst of all
the regulatory variable – affects the incentives to invest, leading to an underin-
vestment equilibrium. Great attention is also devoted to the analysis of some
regulatory options that have been proposed or implemented in the context of
NGANs. An optimal policy is then proposed and some preliminary conclusions
are sketched. Then empirical evidence is provided: a literature review is per-
formed with the aim of exploring the trends in the empirical literature regarding
both broadband penetration and investment behavior. Then an overview of the
broadbandmarkets in the EuropeanUnion is provided, highlighting some stylized
facts and trends of the markets. In section 7 I proceed to the estimation of the de-
terminants underlying broadband adoption by sketching and estimating different
speciﬁcations of a panel-data model with country-level data. In section 8 we re-
fer to a ﬁrm-level data-set to explore the investment behavior of both incumbents
and competitors in the ﬁxed markets. Section 9 concludes.
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3.2. An overview on NGANs implementation
Next generation access networks are an evolution of current copper-based net-
works. Theirmain feature relates to thewide adoption of the Internet Protocol (IP)
in the transmission of information across the network2. NGNs differ from exiting
networks in that they exploit a single platform for the transmission of a plurality
of services and contents, whereas existing networks have been planned to sup-
port speciﬁc services (e.g. voice calls). Therefore, NGANs do not discern among
different services since information is carried as data packets and accordingly no
priority is granted to any kind of services3.
As demand for new applications and services arises (e.g. IpTV), the upgrading
of the networks cannot be delayed any longer. Indeed, a gradual migration to-
wards the deployment of ﬁber networks can be observed in those countries where
broadband penetration rates are higher. The technological frontier is nowadays
represented by the Japanese market, where the former monopolist NTT owns the
widest FTTH (Fiber-to-the-Home) network in terms of connected households
(OECD, 2008a). The complete deployment of this network is expected by 2010 and
total investments are estimated at about 37 billion of euros (Ofcom, 2007). In the
US, three of the main players in the ﬁxed markets (AT&T, Verizon and Qwest) are
deploying proprietary FTTH networks which are expected to reach among 50%
and 70% of the population. In Table 1 main investment projects in NGANs at a
European level are shown.
3.3. Broadband adoption in the EU: an overview
Broadband adoption within the European Union has followed during the years
different growth paths in each country. In 2007, the number of broadband access
lines in percentage of the population in the EU 25 was on average around 20%,
2 The classical deﬁnition of an NGN is “a packet-based network able to provide telecommunica-
tion services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies
and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related tech-
nologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers
and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and
ubiquitous provision of services to users" (ITU, 2005, p. 53).
3This claim, however, should not be confused with the concept of “net neutrality”. See infra.
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TABLE 1
France In France, three of the main ﬁxed operators (France
Télécom, Iliad and Neuf Cegetel) have announced
substantial investments in the upgrading of their access
networks in the main French cities. Moreover,
Numericable, the leading cable operator in France, has
already started some projects based on FTTLA(Fiber to
the last ampliﬁer) technology in some of the main cities.
The French government has declared that the policy
goal is to connect through FTTH four million of
households by 2012.
Germany Deutsche Telekom is currently upgrading its access
network with a mix of FTTC (Fibre-to-the-Curb) and
VDSL technologies. The goal is to connect 17 million of
users in 800 cities. After some criticism on the behalf of
the European Commission, DT has announced that part
of the network will be realized in co-operation with
some competitors.
Italy In March 2007, Telecom Italia has announced a plan for
the upgrading of its access network, using a mix of FTTC
and FTTB (Fibre-to-the-Building) technologies,
according to geographical and economic characteristics
of the areas that have to be reached. These new
technologies will reach 8% of the population by 2010.
The Netherlands In July 2007, KPN has reached an agreement with its
competitors on the interconnection to its new ﬁbre
network. Accordingly, KPN has already started a
migration process towards an NGAN which will cover
the whole population by 2009. Total investments are
around 1 billion of euro.
Spain Telefónica has announced a project for the deployment
of an “All-IP” network which will combine both VDSL
and FTTx technologies.
United Kingdom The former incumbent BT has announced in 2004 the
creation of a NGAN, named 21st Century Network), and
in 2008 has unveiled a super-fast broadband plan in
order to roll out a new UK ﬁxed-line network offering
broadband speeds ﬁve times quicker than those
currently available. Total investments are around £1.5
billion.
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essentially in line with the OECD average (19,96%). If one restricts attention to the
group of countries belonging to the EU 15, the broadband penetration rate is even
higher (23,6%), reaching a level of broadband adoption comparable with the US
(23,3%)4.
However, the current situation in each member state shows some peculiarities
that can be traced back to the economic and regulatory features that were already
in place in each market before the adoption of a common regulatory framework.
Therefore, within the EU 15, it is possible to identify a leading group of coun-
tries where broadband adoption rates are higher than 25% (Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom), and another
group of countries (Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) which is currently
lagging behind, with adoption rates rather below the EU average.
The reasons behind the different shapes of the broadband adoption curves can be
traced back to several factors, such as population density (which is directly linked
with the possibility of exploiting economies of scale from the producers side) or
GDP growth rate, but also to the regulatory and legal features of the ﬁxed markets.
More in detail, the possibility of quickly reaching substantial economies of scale
(on the producers side) as well as the impact of network effects (on the consumers
side) seem to play a signiﬁcant role. It is indeed worth remarking that higher levels
of broadband penetration can be observed in those countries where cable-based
technologies have been more widely developed.
Furthermore, many legal and regulatory variables seem to equally play a role in
spur-ring broadband adoption and therefore in stimulating new investments. In-
deed, the process which should lead to a common regulatory framework has not
yet been completed. Although a minimum level of regulatory harmonization has
already been reached, many different policies on the same issues are currently en-
dorsed by different NRAs. Indeed, looking at the growth rates both before (2000
-2003) and after (2003 – 2007) the implementation of the regulatory package of
2002, it can be observed that the adoption of the new regulatory provisions has
not led to a full convergence towards a uniform growth path within the European
Union. However, no policy conclusions can be directly derived from the raw data
reported in these tables. Indeed, these ﬁgures are the result of the interaction
of several economic and legal variables that need to be carefully treated through
4However, it should be mentioned that recently, data on broadband penetration in the US have
been criticized by some scholars on methodological grounds, see Wallsten (2006).
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TABLE 2. Total Broadband penetration rate in some OECD Coun-
tries, 2000 – 2007
Source: OECD, ITU, EC Implementation Reports
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FIGURE 3.3.1. Comparison of total broadband penetration rate in
some OECD countries, 2000 - 2007
Source: OECD, ITU
appropriate econometric models, in order to isolate the impact of each of them
before one can proceed to some policy evaluations. However, at a ﬁrst inspection,
some interesting trends are revealed by the data. In particular, it can be observed
that those countries which started from lower adoption rates have shown in the
last eight years higher growth rates, thus apparently adhering to the tenets of the
standard economic models of growth in innovative industries. Indeed, the exis-
tence of spillovers in the form of economies of scale and network effects in broad-
band adoption seem to play a signiﬁcant role in the evolution of the telecommu-
nications industry.
This trend is more evident if one compares the broadband adoption path in South
Korea, and the average OECD broadband penetration rate (Figure 3.3.1.). The Ko-
rean growth rate has continuously declined over time because of both the mar-
ginal diminishing impact of scale economies and the (partial) saturation of the
market. At this stage of the analysis, then, one could ask whether a new rise in the
broadband adoption rate could be expected from a new investment wave in NGNs
and if its impact can be predicted from the observation of past and current data.
In order to answer this question, the factors that determine broadband adoption
have to be identiﬁed.
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TABLE 3. Compound annual growth rate in Broadband uptake in
some OECD Countries, 2000-2007
Source: OECD, EC Implementation Reports
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It is quite evident that an increase in broadband penetration can be reached only
through new investments in the network infrastructure. From the supply side,
however, market players will embark in new investments only if a) new demand
for broadband services can be reasonably expected to rise in the next future, b)
ﬁnancial resources are available to be channeled into new investments and c) a
stable regulatory environment can be expected after the investments are made.
For the purposes of the essay, I will focus on the expected level of demand and
regulatory intervention on themarkets, taking these two as themain variables that
directly affect investment choices, although, in the light of the current ﬁnancial
crisis, the issue of ﬁnding new sources for ﬁnancing investments canbe signiﬁcant
as well.
I assume, therefore, that expected demand for new services and products in the
broadband markets is affected by three macro-categories of variables:
• General macroeconomic factors;
• Industry speciﬁc features;
• Market speciﬁc features.
General macroeconomic factors are related to the fundamentals of the economy,
i.e. GDP growth, inﬂation growth and so on. These factors have a signiﬁcant
impact on broadband penetration rates. In Figure 3.3.2. the correlation among
broadband penetration and GDP is shown for some OECD countries. The cor-
relation coefﬁcient for the years 2000-2006 is around 0.55615. This correlation is
not surprising since it can be expected that more resources available to the repre-
sentative agent in the economy (the GDP per capita) lead to higher levels of con-
sumption.
Among macroeconomic factors, a prominent role is played by access to lending in
capital markets. Indeed, especially in times of ﬁnancial turmoil, it could happen
that investment opportunities are not fully caught because of credit rationing on
the markets6. In this periods, even ﬁrms with rather stable cash ﬂows such as
telecom ﬁrms could ﬁnd difﬁcult to ﬁnd new source of ﬁnancing.
5In order to have a linear relationship, in Figure 3.3.2. (and in all the following ﬁgures) the correla-
tion coefﬁcient has been computed on the logs of the variables. The correlation coefﬁcient tends
to show a weaker impact on larger samples, however the correlation still holds.
6See Tirole (2006).
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FIGURE 3.3.2. Correlation among broadband penetration and GDP
per capita in some OECD countries, 2000 - 2006
Finally, the broadband adoption rate in a given country is directly linked with the
average retail price of broadband services. Although country-level data on broad-
band retail prices are quite incomplete and lack of a signiﬁcant time series, even
in this small sample for the year 2007, a negative relationship among these two
variables can be observed (Figure 3.3.3.). In Figure 3.3.3., a correlation of -0.5874
among broadband penetration rate and average subscription prices (in US dol-
lars, PPP adjusted) for the year 2007 in some OECD countries can be observed.
As one would expect, the correlation is negative (-0.5119), meaning that higher
broadband subscription prices lead to lower adoption rates.
Running the risk of oversimplifying a bit, from a microeconomic point of view,
one could see the penetration rate as the quantity of broadband demanded by
the representative consumer, whereas the GDP and the average prices are respec-
tively his income and the relative prices of the broadband good. This perspective
is backed by Figure 3.3.3., where broadband penetration and average subscription
prices show a negative correlation.
3.3.1. Market conditions and regulation impact inbroadbandadoption. Ex-
pectations over the future levels of demand are inﬂuenced by industry related
factors, such as the possibility for players of exploiting market power in order to
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FIGURE 3.3.3. Correlation among broadband penetration and aver-
age subscription prices (in USD, PPP) in some OECD countries, 2007
extract oligopolistic rents7, or potential expansion in adjacent markets through
strategies aimed at offering services in bundles. Finally, within the ﬁxed broad-
band markets themselves, expectations on the level of demand are given by the
possibility of customers migration towards alternative operators or technologies.
In this respect, broadband adoption seems to show a positive correlation with
competitive market structures. In particular, in Figure 3.3.4. the relationship is
shown among the level of per capita broadband adoption, and the concentration
in the ﬁxed markets, as measured by the OECD regulatory index. The variable on
the horizontal axis is a transformation of the OECD index on market structure. In
particular, since the latter index has a range of values between 0 (maximum level
of competition in the market) and 6 (maximum level of concentration) the vari-
able has been transformed as follows:
lnewmktstr = log (7−OECDmarket structure index)
In this way I simply invert the ranking of the index to make results more intu-
itive. Now the index (before applying the logarithmic transformation) goes from 1
(monopoly) to 7 (highly competitive market). Figure 3.3.4. then shows a positive
7Assuming that ﬁrms compete à la Cournot, which is not always the case, especially if high ﬁxed
costs are involved.
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FIGURE 3.3.4. Correlation among per capita broadband subscribers
and market structure in some OECD countries, 1997 - 2007
correlation between the broadband adoption rate and the degree of competition
in the market.
A useful source for measuring the general impact of regulation on the telecommu-
nications markets are the OECD Regulatory Reform Indexes (RRIs). These indexes
are available for regulated industries and for the telecommunications sector they
are based on three main variables (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006)8:
• Entry regulation: this variable looks at the legal limitations on the number
of competitors in the communications markets;
• Public ownership: indicates the extent of direct governmental control in
one or more ﬁrms;
• Market structure: this is an index of the market shares of new entrants in
the telecommunications markets.
These indexes provide an easy way to compare the effectiveness of regulatory in-
tervention in several countries, and they can be used as an approximation for
measuring the impact of regulation and market conditions on broadband adop-
tion.
8See the appendix for details.
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TABLE 4. OECD Telecom Regulatory Reform Indexes (RRIs) in some
OECD countries, 2000 – 2003
Source: OECD
The Market Structure index: some remarks. Since competition in the telecom-
munication sector can take many forms, a few words on how the market struc-
ture index is constructed and what it actually measures are needed. The index
covers telecom ﬁrms operating in each country (both ﬁxed and mobile) and it
is a weighted average of three sub-indexes which measure the aggregate market
share of new entrants (i.e. other licensed operators - OLO) in the three main mar-
kets: trunk, international and mobile markets. Therefore, this index is just a proxy
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for the overall degree of competition in the communications sector. Moreover, it
does not discriminate among the various forms of competition (intra- vs. inter-
platform). However, for the purposes of the present paper, I believe that this index
provides enough information on the competitive climate in the markets.
3.4. Literature review
Recent literature on telecommunications regulation has mainly focused on the
impact of unbundling policies on investments and broadband penetration. In-
deed, this strand of literature has its roots in the liberalization process which has
been observed during the 1990s in many developed countries.
Several empirical works have investigated the impact of regulation on telecom-
munication operators’ choices. At a general level, two main lines can be envisaged
in this literature. On the one side stand those works that investigate the factors
underlying the adoption of new telecommunication services. On the other side, a
more recent literature has spurred, aiming at ﬁnding the variables that affect the
level of investments in the telecommunications industry and the impact of differ-
ent regulatory measures on the investment choices of the agents in the market.
3.4.1. The empirical literature on broadband penetration. The drivers un-
derlying broadband adoption have been recently studied in several empirical pa-
pers. However, the evidence is quite contrastive among the different studies, and
therefore no conclusive policy recommendations can be drawn.
Garcia-Murillo and Gabel (2003) analyze the role of regulation in stimulating ﬁxed
telecommunications penetration. The data-set refers to a cross-section over 135
countries in the year 2001. The authors ﬁnd no evidence of correlation among
unbundling policies and broadband penetration, whereas a positive relationship
is found with respect to the level of competition in the markets.
In the same vein, Burnstein and Aron (2003) regress the number of broadband
subscribers over a set of regulatory variables, including ULL prices. Their data
refer to a US cross-section for the year 2000. They ﬁnd that inter-platform com-
petition signiﬁcantly affects broadband penetration: “after controlling for the de-
mand and cost inﬂuences on adoption, intermodal competition drives increased
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penetration in a state” (ibidem, p. 7). Accordingly, the authors come to the pol-
icy conclusion that policies that encourage facilities-based competition are to be
preferred to ubiquitous access.
Kim, Bauer and Wildman (2003) estimate the impact of broadband penetration on
a cross-section of 30 OECD countries in 2001. They perform a OLS regression on
prices of broadband and dial-up connections and several other variables, ﬁnding
that most of the independent variables are not statistically signiﬁcant; only pre-
paredness of a nation (i.e. diffusion of computers in the households) and the cost
conditions of deploying advanced networks are consistent in explaining broad-
band uptake. However their results are not very robust and their analysis can suf-
fer of biases because of the lack of a time series.
Ford and Spiwak (2004) study the impact of prices and costs of unbundled loops
on availability of broadband services on a US panel with semi-annual observa-
tions for the period 2002-2003. The authors regress a set of regulatory and socio-
economic variables on universality of access (i.e. availability of at least one broad-
band provider) and competitive broadband access (i.e. availability of at least four
broadband pro-viders), ﬁnding that lower unbundled loop prices are associated
with an increase both in universality of access and competitive access.
Denni and Gruber (2005) study the role of intra- and inter-platform competition
on the diffusion of broadband infrastructure. The authors analyze a panel of semi-
annual observations from 2000 to 2004 across the US states, showing that both
types of competition signiﬁcantly affect the rate of broadband penetration. More
precisely, inter-platform competition seems to have a higher impact on the rate of
diffusion than intra-platform competition.
Similarly, Distaso, Lupi and Manenti (2005) develop a model of intra-platform ver-
sus inter-platform competition and then test it on a panel of 14 European coun-
tries with quarterly observations from 2001 to 2004. They regress broadband pen-
etration on the level of market concentration, the price of unbundled local loops
and leased lines and someother regulatory variables. Their results show that lower
unbundling prices stimulate broadband uptake.
Flamm (2005) examines the evolution of broadband in the US from 2000 to 2003 at
zip-codes level. The paper ﬁnds that geography, income and population density
are among the main determinants of broadband penetration, whereas most of the
regulatory variables (such as the eRate program and the rural health care grants)
appear ineffective in stimulating broadband availability.
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Wallsten (2006) evaluates the impact of unbundling regulations on broadband
adoption over a data-set of 30 OECD Countries during the period 1999-2003. The
author takes into account several kinds of unbundling (full unbundling, bitstream
and sublo-op unbundling) as well as interconnection (collocation) regulations
(co-mingling and virtual). Heﬁnds that unbundling policies donot promote broad-
band adoption; however, interconnection may play a signiﬁcant role in stimulat-
ing new entry, even though entry by itself does not necessarily stimulates invest-
ment.
Finally, Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) analyze the impact of diverse regulatory
tools, such as net neutrality regulations and unbundling on the penetration rate
of ﬁber connections (NGNs) in the EU27 with semi-annual observations over six
years (2002-2007). The authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the
number of unbundled DSL connections per capita and the number of ﬁber con-
nections, bringing thus further evidence in support of the intra- vs. inter-platform
competition view.
The picture emerging from the reviewed literature suggests that the determinants
of broadband adoption are still a question open to debate. Moreover, many of the
above studies tend to focus on the US broadband market, whereas a sound eco-
nomic assessment of the European regulatory provisions seem to be lacking. This
may be mainly due to lack of data on the European markets, heterogeneity among
data sour-ces and to some difﬁculties in constructing time series for European
countries. Furthermore, as a general remark, many of these empirical studies do
not properly investigate the impact of regulatory provisions on long-run welfare.
Indeed, although regulation can be beneﬁcial in the short term, it can fail in giv-
ing proper investment incentives to market players, thus leading to a gradual de-
crease in the deployment of new infrastructures. Empirical literature focusing on
investment is reviewed below.
3.4.2. The empirical literatureon investments. The study performedbyGreen-
stein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) is one of the ﬁrst attempts to capture the im-
pact of regulation on investments at a ﬁrm-level. The authors analyze a panel
of 101 Local Exchange Companies from 1986 to 1991. Even though the study is
quite dated, their methodological intuitions are still very useful. Indeed, the par-
tial adjustment model for investments in tangible assets developed in the paper
has been used in further empirical works. Their main ﬁnding is that price reg-
ulation schemes (price caps) can affect the deployment of digital equipment at
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the local exchange level. However, “more liberal regulatory environments lead to
greater incentives to deploy modem equipment, and [...] LECs respond to those
incentives” (ibidem, p.189). Furthermore, price caps regulations seem to be more
effective in stimulating investment than earnings sharing provisions.
In an important paper, Röller and Waverman (2001) provide a model for telecom-
munications investmentwith the aimof investigating the relationship among eco-
nomic growth and telecommunication infrastructures development. The authors
develop and estimate a system of equations, in order to avoid reverse causality
among investments and growth. More in detail, the investment (supply) equation
is obtained by regressing investment in telecom infrastructure on prices of tele-
phone services, geographic area, government surplus and waiting list for main
lines per capita. The authors ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant positive causal link
among economic growth and telecom infrastructure. Because of the presence of
network externalities in telecommunications networks, this trend is strengthened
when a critical mass of telecommunications infrastructure is reached.
Ai and Sappington (2002), examine the behaviour of the Regional Bell Operating
Companies from 1986 to 1999 in terms of revenues, investment and proﬁt. The
authors compare the level of these variables under incentive regulation and rate-
of-return regulation, ﬁnding that higher values of investment are associated with
incentive regulation provisions. However, the authors acknowledge the risk of en-
dogeneity of regulatory variables and accordingly some instruments are added to
their regressions in order to mitigate the problem.
Li and Xu (2004) focus on the role of market privatization and liberalization on in-
vestment. They analyze a large data-set of 166 countries over nearly twenty years,
ﬁnding a positive complementarity between privatization and competition in fa-
cilitating investment.
Chang, Koski and Majumdar (2003) tackle instead two distinct aspect of regula-
tion: the impact of access prices on incumbents’ investment and the relation-
ship among competition and entry in the market. The authors address the two
problems by looking at two distinct data-sets. For the purposes of the current
work, only the ﬁrst part is reviewed here. The authors look at the deployment of
ﬁber-based technologies on the incumbents’ networks, ﬁnding that lower access
prices tend to promote greater deployment of digital technologies among ILECs.
According to the empirical results, this apparently odd phenomenon can be ex-
plained through the fact that lower prices boost the demand for new services and
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technologies and consequently give incentives to incumbents to invest in order to
meet the demand.
Ingraham and Sidak (2003) provide empirical evidence in support of the Jorde-
Sidak-Teece hypothesis, which states thatmandatory unbundling at TELRICprices
harms incumbent’s investment because it increases the incumbent’s cost of eq-
uity: indeed, since “TELRIC prices are not compensatory in economic terms, ILEC
returns will suffer in times of recession and improve during an expansion” (ibi-
dem, p. 2). According to the authors, empirical analysis of daily market data seems
to conﬁrm this hypothesis. However, their results are signiﬁcant only for two over
four of the ILEC considered. Moreover, the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis focuses
only on incumbents’ behaviour, whereas nothing is said about investment incen-
tives on the behalf of competitive carriers.
Garrone (2004) provides a ﬁrst attempt concerning the analysis of the investment
behaviour of 23 European ﬁxed incumbents among 1995 and 2002. Investments
are regressed over a set of ﬁnancial variables, corporate restructuring variables
(eg. State’s control) and regulatory variables. The value added of this work is the
inclusion of ﬁnancial and corporate governance aspects within the modeling of
the investment behaviour. The main regulatory ﬁndings of the paper are that pri-
vatization does not signiﬁcantly affect the investment behaviour, whereas liber-
alization, competition and unbundling obligations depress incumbents’ incen-
tives to invest. Although very valuable, this study suffers from some shortcom-
ings. In particular, the data-set is quite small and unbalanced and the analysis is
performed with exclusive focus on incumbents’ behaviour.
Hausman and Sidak (2005) discuss four rationales for mandatory unbundling (re-
tail competition, entry barriers, “stepping stone” hypothesis and wholesale com-
petition) and test them on ﬁve representative countries. The authors test the ef-
fectiveness of mandatory unbundling as enabling future facilities-based invest-
ment (“stepping stone” theory). Even though the authors acknowledge theoreti-
cal soundness to the theory, they do not ﬁnd empirical evidence in support of the
hypothesis. The authors claim that this failure can be due to the fact that “regu-
lators have been remarkably unconditional in developing access regulations that
would support the transition to facilities-based competition. In particular, reg-
ulators have failed to impose obligations to ensure that promises to evolve from
UNE-based to facilities-based competitor are subsequently realized”(ibidem, p.
224). Moreover, mandatory unbundling may have attracted ﬁrms interested in
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short term proﬁts (“hit and run” strategies) to the detriment of long-run competi-
tion.
The “stepping stone theory” is at the core of Hazlett (2005), which investigates
the investment path of the US telecommunications industry from 2000 onwards.
An analysis of the investment behaviour of the main US telecom ﬁrms is per-
formed and the ﬁndings are that mandatory unbundling has not proven effec-
tive in spurring new investments neither from incumbents nor from new entrants.
Moreover, resale competition, where achieved through regulation, has not led to
additional facilities-based entry; on the contrary, it has generally displaced such
activity. Therefore, according to the author, the stepping stone theory has not
shown a signiﬁcant predictive power.
In the last few years, a growing debate on telecommunications investment in the
EU has spurred, mainly because of the i2010 initiative launched in the framework
of the Lisbon strategy. Accordingly, some econometric studies have been per-
formed by economic consultancies. London Economics and PricewaterHouse-
Cooper (2006), in a study commissioned by the DG InfoSoc of the European Com-
mission, analyze the investment behaviour of ﬁrms operating within the perime-
ter of the markets for electronic communications between 2001 and 2004. In this
study a data-set is collected at ﬁrm level for the main ﬁrms in the 25 European
Countries. A regression is performed in order to check the impact of regulation
of investments. Gross investment in tangible assets is employed as dependent
variable, whereas, among the regressors, the OECD Regulatory Index9 is used as a
measure of regulatory effectiveness. Themain ﬁnding of this study is that “a better
performing regulatory regime does contribute to higher levels of investment” (ibi-
dem, p. 50). This study however suffers from some inaccuracies in data gathering,
since investment ﬁgures have been processes quite arbitrarily.
After this study, and partly in response to it, two more studies have been per-
formed, one commissioned by the ETNO (European Telecommunications Net-
work Operators’ Association) and the other by the ECTA (European Competitive
Telecoms Association). The ﬁrst study (LECG, 2007) analyzes ﬁrms in 12 European
Countries, regressing broadband penetration over a set of variables, including the
wholesale prices of ULL and Bitstream. The main ﬁnding is a negative correla-
tion among broadband penetration and tight access policies. Furthermore, the
9See Cowley and Nicoletti (2006).
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authors stress that increased intra-platform competition, achieved through regu-
lation,might be achieved at the expense of longer-term interplatformcompetition
and investment in alternative infrastructure. The authors postulate that there is
a positive link between end-user demand and network investment: “[s]ince a re-
duction in the LLUprice reduces the (relative) demand for broadband offered over
alternative infrastructures such as cable, it affects both the probability that large-
scale lumpy investments (such as network upgrades or footprint expansions) are
undertaken at all, and it reduces the magnitude of these investments” (ibidem,
p. 56). The second study, commissioned by the ECTA, has been performed by
Cadman (2007). The author investigates the relationship among investments in
telecommunications and the level of regulatory effectiveness, over a set of 16 Eu-
ropean Countries in 2003 and 2005. The author performs two distinct regressions
using the OECD Regulatory Reform Index and the ECTA Regulatory Scorecard as
a proxy of regulatory effectiveness. In both cases a positive relationship among
regulatory effectiveness and investments is found. However, the critique made
for the use of regulatory indexes also applies for this study. Moreover, the data-set
is very small and the estimates could be biased. Friederiszick, Grajek and Roeller
(2008), perform an econometric investigation on telecom investments on a data-
set with ﬁrm-level data over 25 European Countries from 1997 to 2006. Two main
features distinguish this study from the previous ones. First of all, the problem of
endogeneity of regulatory policy is tacked with instrumental variables techniques.
This solution is derived from Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) and makes
estimates unbiased. Secondly, availability of data at ﬁrm-level make the sample
statistically signiﬁcant, with more than 1000 observations. The authors come to
the conclusion that unbundling provisions in the ﬁxed markets tend to discourage
infrastructure investments by new entrants, but apparently no effects are detected
on incumbents behaviour.
The reviewed literature on investment is very wide-ranging both with regard to
the features of the studies and the conclusions they reach. However, these study
as a whole do not provide conclusive evidence of the impact of regulatory policies
on investment behaviour.
3.5. Why public intervention in broadband access?
Recent theoretical literature on telecommunications regulationhasmainly focused
on the impact of unbundling policies on investments and broadband penetration.
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Indeed, this strand of literature has its roots in the liberalization processwhich has
been observed during the 1990s in most of the developed countries.
The theoretical underpinnings for public intervention in the broadband markets
lie in the economic features of the markets themselves. As pointed out by Picot
and Wernick (2007), there are at least two main arguments in support of govern-
mental intervention in the industry.
The ﬁrst argument relates to the need of universality of broadband access: this is
a common feature of network industries and can involve direct governmental in-
tervention in broadband provision in those geographic areas where private ﬁrms
do not ﬁnd proﬁtable to fully roll-out broadband networks. Public intervention
could be justiﬁed by the fact that the beneﬁts of universal broadband access can
signiﬁcantly exceed the deployment costs of the network. The second feature in-
volves competition law issues. Indeed, the local loop has a bottleneck nature that
constantly puts the industry at risk of being monopolized; from this point of view,
regulatory-driven competition is intended to increase broadband availability at
lower prices, with a signiﬁcant increase in the consumer surplus. However, if the
impact of regulation on short term consumer surplus is almost unanimously con-
sidered beneﬁcial, it is doubtful whether regulation can increase total welfare in
the long run. To be more precise, it is not clear whether regulation gives the right
incentives to market players to properly invest in new infrastructures.
A modern approach to the relationship among investments and regulation can be
traced back to the work of Dixit and Pyndick (1994), where investment choices are
treated as real options. According to this view, each investment decision is equiv-
alent to the exercise of an option; therefore, this implies that one can also decide
not to exercise it (i.e. delay the investment) if the latter alternative is more prof-
itable.
In the light of this framework, one can see regulation as one of the variables affect-
ing the decision whether to exercise the option or not. Gavosto et al. (2007) apply
the real options approach to investments in next generation networks. The au-
thors construct a model in order to investigate investment decisions of telecom-
munications operators under regulation. Their analysis suggests that regulation
affects the investment decision only in the initial period when uncertainty is very
high, whereas in the long run investments do not seem to be signiﬁcantly affected.
The theoretical literature on investment decisions under regulatory uncertainty is
more extensively discussed in the next section.
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3.6. The underinvestment problem and the role of regulation
In view of the above explanations, it becomes very important to understand the
role for public policies, which have historically played a huge part in shaping the
evolutionary dynamics of the telecommunication sector. Indeed, public interven-
tion can sometimes determine the success or the failure of a technology and there-
fore can alter the structure of the markets themselves. More speciﬁcally, public
policies are subject to the risk of failure, since the shape of the industry is con-
tinuously evolving. Furthermore, information asymmetries among public bodies
and market players make possible for the latter to exploit regulatory gaps in their
favor. Thus, regulators, while required to intervene and settle market failures, face
the risk of slowing down the pace of investments in the industry through a mis-
placed intervention.
In order to understand the link between regulation and investments, I refer to
Goldberg’s (1976) ﬁrm-regulatormodel. Within thismodel, each regulatory regime
can be viewed as a contract among the regulator, which acts as the principal, and
the regulated ﬁrm (the agent). It is worth remarking that regulators act at the same
time both as principals towards regulated ﬁrms and as agents towards consumers.
This leads to a double agency relationship, with all the problems related to it in
terms of opportunistic behaviour and asymmetric information. More speciﬁcally,
one of the main risks faced by regulated ﬁrms relates to moral hazard strategies
on the behalf of the regulator (Lyon and Mayo, 2005). As a matter of fact, the lat-
ter could have ex post incentives to deviate from its previous commitments, given
its double-folded agency relationship. Indeed, “from a contractual perspective
[. . . ] the highly incomplete nature of the regulatory framework means that oppor-
tunistic behavior - e.g., inappropriate investment practices by the ﬁrm or abuse of
pricing discretion by the regulator- has always been a nagging possibility” (ibid.,
p. 629). Indeed, since regulators tend to weight consumer surplus more than pro-
ducer surplus (Bower, 1981), once new investments have been made, operators
face the risk that the regulator unexpectedly lowers access tariffs, in order to in-
crease consumer surplus. This means that ex post regulators could be tempted to
transfer wealth from producers to consumers, through severe price constraints.
Therefore, regulatory opportunism could lead to the truncation of the probability
distribution of the investment returns. Accordingly, “anyone contemplating such
investment will anticipate that the high-end of the distribution of possible returns
maybe truncated by access regulation, reducing their expected returns andhence,
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FIGURE 3.6.1
FIGURE 3.6.2
their incentives to invest” (Gans and King, 2004, p. 90). An example of truncation
is represented in Figures 1 and 2, where two distributions of an hypothetical in-
vestment project are sketched. The effect on returns of regulatory opportunism
is twofold: on the one side, it induces ﬁrms to choose investment projects with
lower volatility, but on the other side, ﬁrms tend to pick those investment projects
with lower expected values.
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Indeed, anticipating the possibility of regulatory opportunism, at the beginning of
the regulatory process a regulated ﬁrm will tend to enact several defensive strate-
gies. The most frequently observed strategies in the literature are:
• delay in investment decisions;
• under-investment;
• preference towards less volatile investment projects;
• preference towards external debt ﬁnancing.
Teisberg (1993) shows that ﬁrms facing regulatory uncertainty tend to delay their
investment projects and to prefer smaller investment alternatives. Spiegel and
Spulber (1994) study the effect of regulatory opportunism from a ﬁnancial point
of view. They show that a signiﬁcant exposure to debt is correlated with less severe
access tariffs, and therefore they argue that external debt acts as a shield from ex-
cessive regulatory intervention10. Indeed, this is what it can be currently observed
in the industry, where most of the incumbents tend to have a debt-oriented ﬁ-
nancial structure. This has a clear impact on the investment choices of the ﬁrms.
Indeed, heavily indebted ﬁrms tend to prefer projects with less volatile cash ﬂows.
This is due to the need to match inﬂows and outﬂows in order to reduce the risk of
ﬁnancial distress. Therefore, a ﬁrst policy recommendation can be derived. Since
investing in NGANs involves both operative and ﬁnancial risk, a regulatory policy
aimed at increasing broadband penetration should point at minimizing the riski-
ness of the investments’ cash ﬂows.
In the context of NGANs development, some more features make investments less
attractive. First of all, investment decisions in NGANs are irreversible11: conse-
quently, while irreversibility adds great value to the investment choice itself, at the
same time, this feature increases the riskiness of the project. Furthermore, tech-
nologies underlying the telecommunications industry are characterized by huge
ﬁxed costs and tiny variable costs. As a consequence, short run marginal costs are
very close to zero for each ﬁrm in the industry, whereas long run marginal costs
10 Empirical evidence can be found in Bortolotti et al. (2007).
11See Dixit and Pyndick (1994). According to the authors “an irreversible investment opportunity
is much like a ﬁnancial call option” (p. 9).
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can be signiﬁcantly higher. Thus, the risk of not recovering ﬁxed costs is high,
especially in highly competitive markets.
Finally, the current ﬁnancial structure of many incumbents can act as a constraint
to new investment opportunities. This has been explained in both theoretical
(Spiegel e Spulber, 1994) and empirical literature (Bortolotti et al., 2007), as a de-
fensive strategy enacted by ﬁrms in order to protect themselves from regulatory
opportunism. Indeed, debt-ﬁnanced investments tend to shift the risk of regu-
latory opportunism from shareholders to debt-holders, thus creating an unfavor-
able climate towards the imposition of tight access tariffs.
Therefore, the interaction among the ﬁnancial constraint, the irreversibility con-
straint (Caggese, 2006) and the regulatory opportunism risk, leads the industry
towards a stable underinvestment equilibrium.
Up to now the contractual relationship among the regulator and one single ﬁrm
has been considered. From now on I take a broader perspective on the industry as
a whole. Indeed, form this perspective, I see that the regulatory dilemma relates
not only to spurring investments but also to keeping a competitive market struc-
ture. The-refore, regulators face a trade-off among what has been labeled “dy-
namic efﬁciency”, which relates to the optimal level of investments, and “static ef-
ﬁciency”, which involves the maximization of short-run total surplus. This trade-
off has been studied both in theory and empirically, and it is often at the centre of
debates on regulatory options in an NGAN context. Keeping in mind this trade-
off, in the rest of the chapter some of the main regulatory policies are explored.
3.6.1. A theoretical framework for an optimal policymix. Within the NGANs
debate, several regulatory options have beenproposed in order to stimulate broad-
band provision. In the light of the European context, the following options will be
analyzed:
• local loop unbundling (LLU);
• sunset clauses;
• structural/functional separation;
• risk sharing clauses.
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However, in approaching these options, one has to bear in mind that they are not
mutually excluding. On the contrary, it can easily happen that some of the above
policies are part of a single policy mix. Moreover, it has to be stressed that none
of the above policy options can lead by itself to a ﬁrst best outcome. There is in-
deed a trade-off among investment incentives and the degree of competition in
the markets. Therefore, second best solutions should be sought, bearing in mind
that “there is no single combination of regulatory settings that is best in all situ-
ations and that the various components of a regulatory scheme are interrelated”
(Guthrie, 2006, p. 996).
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU). Local Loop Unbundling has been one of the
most popular regulatory tools in the last decade. It has beenwidely adoptedwithin
the liberalization process in the European Union and has signiﬁcantly impacted
on the degree of competition in the ﬁxed markets, where a general decrease in re-
tail prices has been observed. Nonetheless, LLU does not seem to give the proper
incentives neither to incumbents nor to new entrants to invest in new infrastruc-
tures. As a matter of fact, many empirical studies have been carried out on in-
frastructures development under LLU obligations, but none of them leads to con-
clusive evidence. Indeed, a vast majority of scholars and practitioners nowadays
acknowledge that inter-platform competition is not yet fully asserted in Europe,
whereas intra-platform competition seems to be far more widespread among new
comers. Among the factors that could have affected incentives to invest in the in-
dustry, a study by LECG (2007) points at tight access obligations as a main cause
of low levels of investment: according to this study, EU access policies have made
new investments unattractive both for incumbents – which have been reluctant
to share their networks with alternative operators – and for new entrants – which
have preferred to resell rather than ﬁercely compete through developing alterna-
tive platforms. However, it should be mentioned that these conclusions are at
odds with several other studies claiming the existence of a “ladder of investments”
(see, ex multis, London Economics e PWC, 2006). Therefore, a strict LLU regime
could cause operators to delay investments and instead prefer cheaper and less
volatile alternatives such as reselling. This view has been embraced by the FCC
in 2003, when LLU obligations have been totally removed for investments in ﬁbre
technologies (FCC, 2003).
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Sunset Clauses. Through sunset clauses, regulators impose unbundling obli-
gations for a given time span. The regulator then commits to remove these obli-
gations at a future time, ex ante set. This policy option has been designed with the
aim of inducing new entrants not to rely for long on the incumbent’s infrastruc-
tures, but to develop instead their own infrastructures. From one side it can be
argued that this policy gives incentives at least to the incumbent to invest, since
at the expiration of the clause it will fully take possession of the infrastructure.
However, it could also happen that at the time of expiration of the clause alterna-
tive operators haven’t carried out their investments yet. If this were the case, the
regulator would face a dilemma: it could either 1) abide its commitments and ac-
cordingly remove the obligations or 2) keep the obligations in place. In the former
case, the effect would be a re-monopolization of the market, while in the latter,
the newcomers would take a free ride on incumbent’s investments, thus lowering
the incentives of the incumbent to invest in the ﬁrst place.
Structural/Functional Separation. Separation of the access network is one of
the most intrusive regulatory remedies. This option has been adopted by Ofcom,
spurring an international debate on its effectiveness. The impact of this policy on
social welfare is still debated and typically depends on the technological and eco-
nomic features of the industry. OECD has recently expressed concerns regarding
the adoption of this policy, pointing out that “[t]he results of functional separa-
tion, particularly on investment, are still far from certain and warrant signiﬁcant
research. Regulators should actively consider other policy options at the same
time, which may provide similar outcomes – such as requiring operators to share
internal wiring in buildings”. (OECD, 2008b, p. 11).
A structural/functional separation regime can indeed give incentives both to in-
cumbents and newcomers to under-invest for two main reasons: ﬁrst of all, the
economic contract which gives rise to the separated entity does not give any in-
centive to the managers to reach dynamic efﬁciency; on the contrary, their per-
formance increases proportionally with the degree of network openness12. Sec-
ondly, since alternative operators under a separation regime can easily access to a
12Indeed, if we assume that the mission of the separated entity is to guarantee equal access and
that the managers of the separated entity are paid on performance, their wages will be positively
related with the number of connected players, whereas the level of investments will not directly
affect them.
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shared infrastructure, they could ﬁnd not proﬁtable to give birth to a riskier inter-
platform competition.
Hence, even though structural separation is a tool that guarantees a minimum
level of competition in the markets, its potential downsides lie in the wrong set of
incentives to pursue dynamic efﬁciency. Therefore within the spectrum of regu-
latory options, structural separation is one of the options that can better achieve
static efﬁciency, and accordingly, it seems to better ﬁt full-grown industries with
constant investment rates, rather than industries in the midst of a technological
revolution.
Risk sharing. The amount of investments undertaken by a ﬁrm is clearly af-
fected by volatility in returns. Volatility is the expression of both an operative
risk and a regulatory risk in the investment project, which tend to interact among
them. Within the context of NGANs, a regulator can affect both risks through risk
sharing policies. These policies have the great advantage of reducing volatility and
accordingly increase the NPV of the investment projects.
In order to better clarify this claim, we can depict investment choices as follows13.
Let M be an incumbent who decides to invest in period t0 and assume that af-
ter the investment is made a new entrant enters the market and starts compet-
ing with M. Two forms of competition are then available to the new comer: 1)
reselling (service-based competition) and 2) inter-platform competition, which
obtains when the new entrant decides to invest in the development of its own in-
frastructure. Reselling takes place at time ts(where ts ≥ t0). Furthermore, service-
based competition needs speciﬁc investments on the behalf of the new comer
equal to Is and generates cash ﬂows in each period equal to XES .
Inter-platform competition requires an initial investment by the side of the new
comer equal to II , where II ≥ IS, and it generates cash ﬂows equal to XIM .
Similarly, M will invest an amount equal to IM in t0 and will obtain cash ﬂows
equal to:
• XM0 when the competitor is not competing in the market (thus this cash
ﬂows are monopolistic rents);
• XMS in all the periods in which reselling is in place, and
13The following expressions are an adaptation from Guthrie (2006)
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• XMI in all the periods of infrastructural competition.
Finally, I assume that both investments and cash ﬂows are random variables nor-
mally distributed with given means and variances. In the light of the above as-
sumptions, the NPV of the investment project for the incumbent will be:
(3.6.1) NPVI = E
[
− IM
(1 + r)t0
+
tS∑
t=t0+1
XM0
(1 + r)t
+
tI∑
t=tS+1
XMs
(1 + r)t
+
∞∑
t=tI+1
XMI
(1 + r)t
]
Whereas for a new comer, the NPV will be:
(3.6.2) NPVC = E
[
− IS
(1 + r)tS
+
tI∑
t=tS+1
XES
(1 + r)t
− II
(1 + r)tI
+
∞∑
t=tI+1
XEI
(1 + r)t
]
Although not explicitly introduced in the above expressions, regulation directly
affects both the cash ﬂows (i.e. the Xs) and the investments (i.e. the Is). Notably,
regulatory opportunism negatively affects the incumbent’s NPV, whereas the im-
pact on new comers’ NPV will be positive. However, not only the cash ﬂows are
affected by regulation. Indeed, regulator’s choices can alter both the amount of
investments that will be carried out and the timing of the investment choices.
In the light of the option theory by Dixit and Pyndick (1994), in each period the
incumbent faces the possibility of exercising a real option: indeed he can either
invest or delay the decision to the next period. Therefore, in the model above,
t0 is the period in which the incumbent exercises the investment option. Regu-
lation can clearly affect this choice. In particularly, regulatory uncertainty tends
to make more proﬁtable for the incumbent to delay the exercise of the option.
In the same vein, regulation can give incentives to the new comer to prolong the
service-based competition periods and delay the investments needed for infras-
tructure competition. This happens when the marginal value of the reselling in (2)
is greater that the marginal value of the discounted net cash ﬂows gathered in the
periods of infrastructure competition. This could be due to the fact that the risk
of the reselling is signiﬁcantly lower than the risk of infrastructure competition.
Therefore, in order to increase expected NPVs, risk sharing is needed. Indeed, if
risk were allocated only on the incumbent, the new comer could have a free ride
on the incumbent investments through a “wait and see” strategy.
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Passive Infrastructure sharing. Aprompt example of risk sharing involves the
sharing of passive (i.e. physical) infrastructures. This is a possibility ﬁrst advo-
cated within the European context by the French NRA, Arcep. Among the ad-
vantages underlying the adoption of this policy one can include the abatement
of ﬁxed costs and the decrease in the operational risk, which is proportionately
shared among the operators. Among the disadvantages, there is (at least in the-
ory) the risk of setting up a collusive oligopoly among the ﬁrms who share the in-
frastructures. Moreover, potential free riding on network maintenance could also
lead to a gradual reduction in the Quality of Service (QoS).
3.6.2. RegulationofContents. The problemof regulatory opportunism in the
markets for digital goods can have an impact not only at the physical layer of the
infrastructure, but also at the higher layers of applications and content. Indeed,
the adoption ofNGANs is expected to lead to a huge increase in content consump-
tion14. Truncation of incoming cash ﬂows could take place also in the case of “net
neutrality” policies, i.e. in the case in which telecom operators were prevented
from gathering revenues from applications and content delivered on their net-
works. Some recent regulatory policies in the US telecommunications industry
can be better understood in the light of this framework: indeed, recent “net neu-
trality” provisions have been recently enacted in order to balance the effect of the
ﬁbre investments regulatory forbearance and therefore to prevent the creation of
“walled gardens” on the behalf of bigger players in the market.
Therefore, although aimed at preventing monopolies at the higher layers of the
network, net neutrality policies could be redundant if the physical layer is quite
competitive. Accordingly, uncertainty over expected returns could be signiﬁcantly
lowered if applications and content policies where speciﬁed together with regula-
tory policies for the physical layer of the NGAN infrastructure.
3.6.3. Platform Substitutability and the Demand for New Services. As pre-
viously seen, two main sources of volatility for expected returns in NGAN invest-
ments are public intervention and market risk. In other words, apart from regu-
latory intervention, investment choices are determined by the expected level of
demand for new services. This is a problem that affects all kinds of investments in
14A strong positive correlation among broadband adoption and content consumption is found in
a recent empirical work by Hitt and Tambe (2008).
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which irreversibility plays a signiﬁcant role. Several factors can have an inﬂuence
on the demand for new communications services. These can be classiﬁed as:
• macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, inﬂation growth etc.;
• industry speciﬁc characteristics;
• market speciﬁc characteristics.
Industry andmarket speciﬁc factors relate to technological convergence and tech-
nological evolution processes. These two factors increase the risk of customers
shifting from one technology to others and accordingly increase demand volatil-
ity.
3.6.4. Towards an Optimal Policy Mix. Regulatory policies discussed so far
cannot achieve ﬁrst best solutions. Therefore, in order to identify an optimal
NGAN regulatory framework, regulatory goals should be narrowed down. For the
rest of the paper, it will be assumed that the main regulatory goal in the NGAN de-
velopment phase will be to give incentives to current and potential market players
in order to reach an optimal level of NGAN investments, under the constraint of
a workable competitive market. Indeed, in a phase of substantial technological
evolution, regulatory goals differ from the goals of the liberalization phase, when
a former public monopoly needed to be opened up to competition. In the current
phase new private investments need to be implemented and therefore returns on
investments should be granted. However, this does not mean that investments
should be only pursued by incumbents. On the contrary, investments should be
carried out by as many players as possible, depending on the economic features
of the markets. Analyzing the various features of the above regulatory options,
it appears that regulatory holidays give best ex ante incentives to incumbents in
performing the investments. Indeed, through regulatory holidays, a full appro-
priability of cash ﬂows is granted to the incumbent, but at the same time, similar
provisions could lead to a concentrated market structure, with a generalized price
increase and a reduction in consumer surplus.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies structural separation, which guarantees
the highest degree of regulatory commitment and can signiﬁcantly lower the risk
of regulatory opportunism. At the same time, structural separation guarantees
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equality of access to the infrastructure, thus lowering cash ﬂows volatility. Finally,
among the advantages of such aprovision stands the preservation of a competitive
market structure. However, potential disadvantages of structural separation lie in
the lack of incentives to invest in new networks and this in turn could lead to a
lessening in infrastructural competition and to equilibria of under-investment.
This disadvantage could be overcome through a system of incentives that could
lead market players to share the risk and consequently to invest more.
3.6.5. A Proposal for an Optimal Policy Mix. In this paragraph an incentive
mechanism for risk-sharing is proposed. As we have seen, risk sharing is gener-
ally desirable in an NGN environment, since it leads to a general increase in the
level of investments. Inmany circumstances, however, the risk of free-riding could
prevent the attainment of this virtuous circle. Therefore, risk-sharing clauses can
prove effective only at some stages of development of the infrastructure and only
if combined with other policy tools. Accordingly, what I propose in the follow-
ing is a set of policy tools that can guarantee the achievement of an optimal level
of investments through the sharing of both operative and regulatory risk among
market players. It is assumed that before ﬁbre investments have been carried out,
a structural separation of the access network has been already realized. This en-
sures “Equality of Access” among players and therefore a minimum competitive
threshold in the market15. Once the competitive constraint is satisﬁed, one has to
look at the best mechanism for reaching an optimal level of investments. In my
opinion, this mechanism consists of an auction among market players for whole-
sale interconnection. Essentially, the access division could auction physical and
logical interconnection rights for different levels of the network and then set the
initial price accordingly to the proximity of the interconnection point with the ﬁ-
nal customer, thus reﬂecting the costs of deploying the infrastructure up to the
interconnection. Therefore, the closer to the customer the interconnection point
auctioned by the alternative operator, the higher should be the price, since the
investments needed on the behalf of the alternative operator to reach the ﬁnal
customer are lower16.
15Remember that at § 4.4 I imposed a competitive landscape as a constraint on regulatory goals.
16On the other side of the coin, the price should be higher because the investments on the behalf
of the access division are higher.
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The most attractive feature of an auction mechanism like this one relates to the
creation of a risk-sharing device: indeed, if a competitor opts for a high level of
interconnection, the latter will have to invest signiﬁcantly to reach the ﬁnal cus-
tomer, but the auction price will be lower. From the market players point of view,
an auction mechanism like this is equivalent to an auction for options whose ex-
ercise price is the price paid by the winner. Therefore, each player, once given
the interconnection right, faces the option among investing (not exercising the
option) or delaying the investment (thus exercising the option).
Then, once the auction is performed, in order to ensure that the investments are
really carried out, the regulator should constrain the access division to employ the
auction revenues for realizing the infrastructure up to the interconnection point.
In this way, part of the network will be realized in any case, notwithstanding the
investment choices of the alternative operators, i.e. even if after winning the auc-
tion the alternative operator ﬁnds more proﬁtable a delay in the investment.
In sum, the key phases of the mechanism are:
• Structural separation: to ensure a certain degree of competition in the
markets;
• Auction for interconnection rights: creation of a risk-sharing device among
the incumbent and the alternative player;
• Constraint for the access division to spend the auction revenues for the
roll out of the infrastructure up to the interconnection point.
Finally, it is worth remarking that this mechanism, although imposing strong reg-
ulatory intervention in setting up the policies, leaves in the end the choice among
service based and infrastructure based competition directly to the market17.
3.7. The empirical evidence on Broadband adoption
3.7.1. The Data-set. Data have been gathered form several sources with the
aimof investigating the investment dynamics underlying broadbanddevelopment
with a focus on the European and OECD markets. The panel therefore covers a
17However, it should be also pointed out that one of the disadvantages underlying the adoption of
this mechanism is the risk of an increase in retail prices.
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time span of ten years (1997 – 2007) and 28 countries, mainly belonging to the Eu-
ropean Union. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study on broadband
adoption that deals with such a recent data-set on the European markets.
First of all, general economic and geographical data on the European markets
have been gathered. Main sources have been the OECD Database, as well as
World Bank and Eurostat. Furthermore, Eurostat, OECD and ITU databases have
been employed for gathering some industry related variables as well, such as sub-
scribers to telecom services, aggregate investment etc. However, Eurostat and ITU
provided a quite unbalanced dataset. The OECD database has been proven use-
ful also for several variables related to the ﬁxed markets. It is a balanced and rich
dataset which includes telecommunications regulatory indexes (see Appendix),
ranking countries according to 1) the presence of entry barriers in the sector, 2)
the percentage of State ownership of telecom ﬁrms and 3) the degree of competi-
tion in the markets.
3.7.2. Econometric speciﬁcations and results. In order to investigate the im-
pact of some relevant economic and regulatory variables on broadband penetra-
tion, I proceed by a process of subsequent econometric speciﬁcations and regres-
sions, starting with few signiﬁcant variables, analyzing their behaviour and then
accordingly modifying the speciﬁcation of the model. Therefore, I start with a
baseline model, adopting the following speciﬁcation, in order to focus on the ef-
fect of the degree of market openness:
log
(
BBsubsit
Popit
)
= α + β1 log
(
Gdpit
Popit
)
+ β2 log (mkt.structureit) +(3.7.1)
+β3
(
Bandwidthit
Popit
)
+ β4 log (agric.landit) + ηi + εit
where:
• BBsubs/Pop = number of broadband subscribers on total population;
• Gdp/Pop = Gross Domestic Product per capita (in US $);
• agric.land = percentage of agricultural land in each country observed;
• Bandwidth/Pop= international internet bandwidth per inhabitant (bit/s);
• mkt.structure= market structure in the ﬁxed telecom industry.
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TABLE 5. Descriptive statistics with means and standard deviations
This baseline model is aimed at capturing the effect of competition in the ﬁxed
industry. The other variables are needed to control for the size of the market both
from a ﬁnancial (GDP per capita) and geographic point of view (agricultural land)
and for the quality of the service provided (bandwidth per capita). The market
structure variable is the same transformation of the OECD index on market struc-
ture discussed above.
I make use of a ﬁxed effects (FE) estimator. Therefore, the general form of the
models I am going to estimate will be:
Yit = X
′
itβ + P
′
itγ + ηi + εit
where Y is the broadband penetration rate, X it contains variables which control
for the size of the market and the quality of the broadband connection, Pit con-
tains the set of variables that we are more interested in, such prices and market
structure. The ηi are the ﬁxed effects reﬂecting unobservable country-speciﬁc
characteristics that may be correlated with (Xit, Pit). The εit are the usual zero-
mean error terms, assumed to be i.i.d. and with variance σ2.
Some descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.
The results of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation are shown in the table below.
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BBsubs/pop Coef. Std. Err. t
Gdp/pop 2.190583 0.3476891 6.3
mkt.structure 1.544182 0.5751426 2.68
agric.land -10.2478 2.651565 -3.86
Bandwidth/Pop 0.8199407 0.0701299 11.69
constant 3.644239 10.45827 0.35***
F(27, 127)= 18.62 Prob>F=0.00
overall R-squared=0.2782
Note: *** not signiﬁcant.
We ﬁrst observe that in both the above regressions, almost all coefﬁcients are sig-
niﬁcant at 5% (apart from the percentage of agricultural land in RE and the con-
stant in FE). Moreover, we observe that the sign of the coefﬁcients is the same in
both estimations. This is fully coherent with the theory. In particular, we observe
that broadband adoption is positively related to an increase in (i) the GDP per
capita, (ii) the competitive structure of the market, and (iii) the average quality of
the service. Moreover, the coefﬁcients for the market structure and the bandwidth
per capita are very close in both estimations.
The relationship among the level of per capita GDP and broadband penetration
has a plain economic justiﬁcation: indeed, from a microeconomic perspective,
the GDP level can be viewed as a proxy for the income of the representative con-
sumer, and therefore, a positive link between the two variables is due to the fact
that an increase in income means an increase in the demand for broadband.
Market structure, instead, is one of the most signiﬁcant variables of the model.
Basically, the positive impact of this variable on broadband penetration suggests
that, ceteris paribus, broadband adoption is doomed to be higher in those coun-
tries with lower concentration ratios in the ﬁxed communication industry. This
positive relationship however is valid only for the countries observed and on the
time span considered. This is because during the observed years, the telecommu-
nications industry has undergone a deep transformation both in the technologies
and in the business models. This technological evolution towards the adoption
of broadband technologies was happening during a regulatory phase which has
gradually led to the opening of the markets and, as a consequence, it cannot be
excluded that this causal relationship is only temporary.
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Further speciﬁcations of this model are basically extensions of equation (3.7.1).
The variables that will be added are aimed at capturing price effects and the im-
pact of the existence of barriers to entry in the ﬁxed market. The latter variable is
given by the OECD regulatory index.
In order to measure the impact of the ﬁrst variable, I look for proxies of an in-
dex of the general level of prices at the retail level for a given country in a given
year. For this purpose, I make use of the price of a 3 minutes national call during
peak hours (measured in US $) as a proxy for the general prices level in the ﬁxed
markets. As showed in Figure 3, we should expect a negative impact of the level of
prices on broadband adoption, and this is indeed the case for all the speciﬁcations
provided.
Finally, I add the number of mobile subscribers per capita. This variable is aimed
at capturing the relationship with the mobile markets and the sign of its coefﬁ-
cientwill give us some information on the complementarity/substitutability among
the ﬁxed and mobile technologies. For this speciﬁcation, I restrict attention to the
years 2003-2007.
BBsubs/pop Coef. Std. Err. t
Gdp/pop 3.025188 0.4932386 6.13
mkt.structure 1.314779 0.709687 1.85*
Price 3 min ﬁx -0.2167309 0.1065206 -2.03
Mob.subs 1.565792 0.5009599 3.13
constant -42.35065 2.975216 -14.23
F(24, 86)= 17.69 Prob>F=0.00
overall R-squared=0.4874
Note: * signiﬁcant at 5%.
In the above regression, although the coefﬁcient of the market structure becomes
less signiﬁcant, I observe that the level of prices in the ﬁxed markets has a nega-
tive impact of broadband adoption. Moreover, we see that broadband adoption
tends to increase with the number of mobile subscribers. This indeed could be
interpreted as a tendency to consume digital goods on more than one device.
Finally, I add to the last speciﬁcation the impact of barriers to entry in the ﬁxed
markets.
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BBsubs/pop Coef. Std. Err. t
Gdp/pop 3.034561 0.493703 6.15*
mkt.structure 1.287965 0.710787 1.81
Price 3 min ﬁx -0.21764 0.106603 -2.04
Mob.subs 1.624285 0.505218 3.22
Entry 0.275118 0.294317 0.93***
constant -42.7042 3.001327 -14.23
F(24,85)=26.97 Prob>F=0.00
overall R-squared=0.487
Note: * signiﬁcant at 5%; *** not signiﬁcant.
Here we ﬁrst note that the coefﬁcient of this new variable is not statistically signif-
icant in the ﬁxed effects regression, whereas it is in the random effects. In the RE
estimation, this variable has a positive impact, meaning that lower entry barriers
to the markets lead to and increase in the rate of broadband subscription.
3.7.3. Comments. The results of the estimation exercises are consistent both
with the theory and with the stylized facts pointed out in the previous section.
From a regulatory point of view, the take-home lesson is that a more competitive
environment leads to higher adoption rates.
In my opinion, however, this rather intuitive conclusion depicts only a part of the
story. Indeed, in network industries what is beneﬁcial in the short-term could
lead to undesirable side effects in the long run. To be more precise, I examine how
the incentives to invest are affected by the legal and economic conditions of the
markets.
3.8. Firm-level analysis of the investment behavior
I now turn to the analysis of the investment decisions at a ﬁrm level. The aim of
this section is to investigate the dynamics underlying the decision of a telecom-
munication ﬁrm regarding how much to invest in the development of the ﬁxed
infrastructure. This choice is clearly affected by several variables, which range
from macroeconomic conditions to the level of competition in the markets and
the regulatory environment. The topic has been heavily debated across Europe,
especially with respect to the impact of regulatory provisions on the incentives
to invest. As already mentioned, the debate has been polarized on two opposite
views: the ladder of investment theory on one side and the theory which sees
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provisions such as the unbundling of the local loop as chilling for investment de-
cisions.
If, at least in theory, both views sound plausible, their applicability to European
markets is closely related to the incentives and the economic conditions the play-
ers face on the markets. Therefore, the aim of this part of the study is to extract
some trends and stylized facts that could be useful to shed new light to the de-
bate and to improve the theoretical models on this topic. Hence the aim of the
following empirical investigation is to better understand the impact of regulatory
provisions, mainly related to the opening of the markets to new competitors and
the role played directly in the market by the public sector, on the investment dy-
namics.
Before proceeding, a caveat is needed. Data on investments are, in general, dif-
ﬁcult to retrieve. In the telecommunications sector, the problem is exacerbated,
since data on annual reports comprise both the ﬁxed line segment and the mo-
bile18. The crucial task faced during the data gathering activity has been the iden-
tiﬁcation of the amount of ﬁxed tangible investments exclusively related to the do-
mestic ﬁxed line segment, thus excluding ﬁnancial investments and investments
related to other business lines (mobile and international activities). This task has
involved therefore a careful investigation of the supplementary information in-
cluded in the documents accompanying the annual reports. However, in few cases
it has been impossible to exactly identify the contribution to the ﬁxed line: I de-
cided however to keep these observations rather than dropping them.
3.8.1. The Dataset. The dataset is composed of 37 European ﬁrms, analyzed
over a time span of ﬁve years (2003-2007). The ﬁrms are 24 incumbents and 13
leading competitors19. The data collected refer mainly to tangible ﬁxed assets and
turnover. Tangible ﬁxed assets (TFA), which is an item in the assets side of the
balance sheet, includes properties, plants and equipments and all the physical
network infrastructure equipment.
In most of the ﬁrms observed this item has been taken with respect only to the
ﬁxed line segment. However, there are cases in which splitting the two business
18The point is highlighted also in OECD (2009), where a signiﬁcant attempt in the analysis of in-
vestment behavior in the European broadband markets is performed. The study however is at a
country level and the time span covered is up to 2005.
19See the appendix for details.
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segments has not been possible. In those cases, I collected aggregate data includ-
ing both ﬁxed and mobile segments.
The key variable of the dataset, net investments, has been computed as the differ-
ence in TFA from one ﬁscal year to the next one. In my opinion, this is the closest
available proxy for capturing the investment decision by the management of the
ﬁrm. In few cases, the data on tangible assets were not available and thus I have
been referring to the CAPEX as indicated in the cash ﬂow statement.
Moreover, I collected data on ﬁxed line turnover and then constructed the follow-
ing variable, which can be expressed in percentage terms:
Net Investmentst
Turnovert
=
TFAt − TFAt−1
Turnovert
∗ 100
The measure obtained can then be used for comparisons across ﬁrms of different
size.
Moreover, I employ some of the variables already used for the econometric part
of this paper such as broadband growth, GDP growth and the OECD Regulatory
indexes. The value-added of this dataset lies in the fact that it is the ﬁrst attempt
to explore investment behavior at a ﬁrm level in the European markets under the
new regulatory framework adopted in 2002.
3.8.2. Analysis of the investment dynamics. In the Table 6 the global dynam-
ics of investments during the time span 2003-2007 are reported. The ﬁrst striking
feature is that, apart from 2004, when investments have been growing by 8.2%, the
global growth rate is generally ﬂat. However, at a closer look, this performance is
the result of the opposite behaviors of the two kinds of market players: the com-
petitors, on one side, which have been growing at a fast pace, and the incumbents,
on the other, which instead show, on average, negative rates of growth.
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The main reason for the divergent behavior of the incumbents and the competi-
tors may lie in the fact that incumbents have already at their disposal a network
and so they just need to perform small investments aimed at ﬁxing and upgrading
the network: as a consequence, depreciation and amortization of the assets tend
to prevail over new investments.
Competitors instead need to build their own and therefore they need to embark
on a relatively higher level of investment. These ﬁgures are however ambiguous
and cannot be used in support of none of the above theories on investment dy-
namics. Indeed, if one could argue that the ﬁgures on the investments performed
by competitors prove the effectiveness of the investment ladder, on the other side,
the chilling effect on the incumbents can be also claimed. Therefore, further anal-
ysis is required before reaching any conclusion. Moreover, it is important to bear
in mind that investments are one of the most volatile macroeconomic variables
and therefore it is very difﬁcult to reach any conclusion concerning their long-run
trend with a short time series like the one at hand.
FIGURE 3.8.1. Average investments as % of turnover
3.8.2.1. Investments and GDP growth. Comparing these data with the rate of
growth of the economies, another interesting feature can be highlighted. Indeed,
in the following ﬁgures, we observe a pro-cyclical behavior for the incumbents,
while the behavior of the competitors is much less related to the growth of the
economy.
This comparison highlights a much more conservative approach towards new in-
vestments from the incumbents compared to the competitors.
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FIGURE 3.8.2
The reason for this lies in the fact that incumbents start from a higher level of
assets and therefore they need to invest less to grow. On the contrary, many com-
petitors started with tiny levels of stock and therefore they need to invest more.
Note, in passing, that this fact has a very deep impact on the pricing strategies of
the two kinds of players: indeed, the need to invest more for the competitors acts
as a constraint on their pricing plans.
3.8.2.2. Investments and Broadband growth. At a market level, I now investi-
gate the relationship between investments and the rate of growth of broadband
subscriptions. At an aggregate level, the correlation coefﬁcient is positive and
equal to 12.84%. However, as one could expect, there is a signiﬁcant difference
among the incumbents and the competitors. Indeed, the correlation coefﬁcient
for the competitors is much higher (27.62%), whereas for the incumbents is nega-
tive (-13,02%). This implies that as the number of broadband subscribers increase,
the incentives to invest tend to decrease for the incumbents anddecrease for com-
petitors. Indeed, the behavior of these two players when facing a growing market
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is deeply different. Incumbents tend to exploit economies of scale, whereas the
new comers have more incentives to invest in a growing market.
3.8.2.3. Investments and Market Structure. An important factor that drives in-
vestment decisions is the degree of competition in the ﬁnal markets (see, ex mul-
tis, Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). Inmydataset, the relationship among the degree
of competition in the ﬁnal markets and the level of investments is negative, both
at an aggregate level (-16.63%) and in the two subgroups of incumbents (-12.42%)
and competitors (-23.53%). The fundamental reason behind this evidence lies in
the fact that more competitive markets lead to a decrease in the extra-rents for the
players, thus making it less appealing for new players. Moreover, in cases in which
the competition is ﬁerce, few resources can be devoted to investments. Therefore,
ﬁrms face the classical trade-off among short term and long-run gains.
3.8.2.4. Investments and Public Ownership. The European debate on NGANs
is also a debate on the role of governments in the development of the networks.
If indeed under many respects the development of NGANs is in the public inter-
est (think for example about the digital inclusion problem), the impact of a direct
intervention in the markets is still highly debatable, because of the side effects
and the deadweight losses involved. Therefore, I take now the OECD public own-
ership index and make a correlation with the level of investments in the market.
The correlation is negative and equal to -26.22%. Interestingly enough, the corre-
lation is very low and close to zero for the incumbents (-6.85%), whereas is much
higher for the leading competitors (-46.36%). These ﬁgures are signiﬁcant under
many respects. First of all, the behavior of the incumbents is almost unaffected by
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FIGURE 3.8.5
public ownership. These results are quite at the odds with the standard economic
theory of incentives under imperfect information. The data on the competitors
instead has not a clear cut interpretation and can be read in both ways: it could
indeed suggest that the presence of the government in the market tends to create
a unfavorable climate for the newcomers, or alternatively that the presence in the
market of solid competitors makes it unnecessary for the government to directly
intervene, so that we can observe a reduction in the scope of intervention for the
government.
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3.8.2.5. Other factors affecting the Investment Behavior. The variables analyzed
so far, however, are not the only ones that affect investment decisions. Indeed,
many other factors play a role in shaping the investment strategy. First of all, the
level of debt of the ﬁrm and the cost of debt is undoubtedly a constraint on the in-
vestment strategies at a ﬁrm level. Indeed, as pointed out by Spiegel and Spulber
(1994), a high level of debt could be desirable for a regulated ﬁrm since it could
act as a shield against excessive regulatory intervention. However, the other side
of the coin is that a high debt to equity ratio puts a constraint on the strategic de-
cisions of the ﬁrm itself. Moreover, input costs can be a burden that reduces the
possibilities to invest. Indeed, if we analyze the relationship between investments
and the number of employees in the ﬁxed market, we observe a negative correla-
tion, equal to -21.03%. As one could expect, for the group of the incumbents this
index is even higher (-34.44%), whereas is smaller for the competitors (-10.83).
3.9. Conclusions
The empirical investigation pursued in this paper basically conﬁrms the existence
of a trade-off among the goal of competitivemarkets in the short-run and the need
to ensure the long-run growth of the sector. Indeed, a service-based oriented form
of regulatory intervention (like the one currently in place in the European Union)
can well serve its liberalization goal. However, the main side effect lies in the re-
duction in the incentives to invest. Moreover, this chilling effect is stronger for the
newcomers, mostly because of the possibility to rely on the investments made by
the owner of the network.
On the other side, when the regulatory intervention, as it is currently happening
with respect to the regulatory approach to the NGNs, tends to focus more on the
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goal of spurring new investments, a negative impact on the rates of adoption by
the ﬁnal users should be expected.
Moreover, governmental intervention that takes the form of ownership of shares
of the incumbent ﬁrms, tends to chill signiﬁcantly the incentives of the competi-
tors to invest.
These results are relevant for the next generation networks environment, where
the adoption of ad hoc regulatory provisions is currently debated. Indeed, in order
to reach at the same time an adequate level of investments without slowing down
the pace of broadband penetration, mild forms of regulation should be looked
for, keeping however in mind that the best regulatory solutions (i.e. those that
guarantee a “workable” competition) can differ according to the economic and
legal characteristics of each market.
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Appendix
The OECD Regulatory Reform Index.
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List of Companies.
Notes: 1) Data ﬁxed-mobile, 2) Data on capital expenditures from cash ﬂow state-
ments.
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